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I INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the Crown and the Ma.mi people of New Zealand/Aotearoa 
bas evolved over the past two centuries into a sophisticated and multi-faceted 
association. Clearly, the relationship does not exist in a vacuum. It is influenced by, 
amongst other things, the wishes of the electorate at large, the increasingly globalised 
environment New Zealand finds itself in, 1 and the political and legal environment. 
Of those influences, perhaps the most significant in the short to medium term is the 
adoption of a mixed member proportional system of representation ("MMP"). It is 
therefore important to understand the implications of the new electoral system for 
Crown-Maori inter-action. 
This paper seeks to identify the various impacts that MMP will have on Maori and 
the Crown, and to explain the evolving relationship between them. I will first define 
the two parties of the relationship for the purposes of the paper. Then I will examine 
briefly the nature of the MMP political system; after which I shall examine the 
specific implications of MMP for the Crown and for Maori. The potential of the 
new relationship Maori will enjoy with Parliament will then be considered, before 
addressing the role of the courts in an era of MMP. I shall conclude by examining 
the evolving relationship between the Crown and Maori. 
I will argue that the relationship between the Crown and Maori is no longer simply 
dyadic. The parties to the Treaty are not strictly speaking partners in any meaningful 
sense, although the relationship is demonstrably one of good faith and mutual 
obligation, and is at the heart of our constitutional arrangements. To cast the 
relationship into the form of a partnership, to the exclusion of Parliament, 1isks losing 
sight of the opp01iunities that MMP represents. 
Law Commission NZLC R34 A New Zealand Guide to International Law and its Sources, 1. 
2 
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I will argue further that the evolution of the relationship will be influenced very 
heavily by new, powerful factors. First and most importantly, Parliament will 
emerge as the primary forum for Maori to pursue their strategic aspirations. 
Secondly, the new electoral system will have significant implications for the Crown, 
Ma.mi, Parliament and the electorate at large, the nature of which we can guess at, 
but not accurately discern. 
Not all of the changes which will appear over the next decade or so are attributable 
to MMP. Some would have occurred regardless. Yet the new electoral system will 
without doubt play a crucial part in the further development of New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements. 
II DEFINITION OF "THE CROWN" 
When Lieutenant-Governor Hobson signed the Treaty in February of 1840 he did so 
on behalf of "Her Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland". 2 The British Crown thereby entered into an endming relationship with 
the Maori people of this country. The concept of the Crown is central to that 
relationship and to the constitutional debate concerning the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
concept of the Crown is, however, not capable of precise definition. 
The notion of the Crown is a term of art in constitutional law.3 Joseph identifies two 
distinct personae - one identifiable (the determinate personae), the other amorphous 
(the indeterminate personae). The determinate personae is the Sovereign, as head of 
state, his or her representative in the form of the Governor-General, the ministers of 
the Crown, the Executive Council, and the core public service. In the absence of a 
concept of the state in British constitutional law the Crown may even be used to 
The Maori text read "Ko Wikitoria, te Kuini o Ingarani". 
Town Jnvestmems v Department of Environment [1978] AC 359 at 398 per Lord Simon of Glaisdale. 
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represent the state itself. The indeterminate personae may be defined to include the 
unifying, symbolic nature of the Crown as an ambiguous and indeterminate entity. 4 
In Treaty discourse, however, the Crown bears a broader connotation. Both the 
Labour Government of 1984-1990 and the subsequent National Government 
embraced the concept of the Crown in advancing their proposals for the settlement 
of Treaty claims.5 In this context the Crown represents executive government. In 
the Public Finance Act 1989, for example, "Crown" is defined to mean Her Majesty 
the Queen in right of New Zealand and includes all Ministers of the Crown and all 
departments, but does not include Officers of Parliament (the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, the Office of the Ombudsmen and the Audit 
Office), Crown entities or state owned enterp1ises.6 In short, "the Crown" is the legal 
personification of the state and of central government itself.7 
That is not to say that the concept of the Crown is exclusive of Parliament. In New 
Zealand, as in other Westminster jurisdictions, the executive and legislative branches 
of government are partially merged. Not only is the Governor-General a constituent 
element of Parliament, cabinet ministers must be Members of Parliament also.8 The 
executive will continue to consist of those members of Parliament who have the 
support of the House to govern. 
P Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney) 1993 , 
490. 
Primarily this appears to be in recognition of the basic fact that the Crown is a party to the Treaty , yet 
it may also serve to present government policies in a way that appears to transcend partisan poli tical 
debate. 
Section 2. "Department" is defined to mean any department or instrument of the Government, or any 
branch or division thereof. The Constitution Act 1986 provides in section 2 that the Sovereign in right 
of New Zealand is the head of state, and that the Governor-General appointed by the Sovereign is the 
Sovereign's representative in New Zealand. In a strict sense the Crown is simply the Queen and the 
Governor-General as her representative in New Zealand. 
P Joseph "The Crown as a legal concept (I)" (1993] NZLJ 126 at 128. 
See also the discussion on the constitution of New Zealand by Sir Kenneth Keith in the forward to the 
Cabinet Office Manual (Wellington, 1991 ). 
9 
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Equally significant in the context of the Treaty is the symbolic nature of the Crown. 
For many Maori the Crown is far more than simply the members of the government 
of the day and their departments. The Chief Judge of the Waitangi T1ibunal, Chif 
Judge Eddie Durie, has observed that Maori have historically held the Crown and the 
government to be separate entities. His Honour concluded that " ... the Crown, for 
many older Maori meant simply 'the perfect law - the one that would come and put 
everything right"'.9 The Crown symbolises the non-Maori party to the relationship 
created by the Treaty, and may include not only the incumbent government but its 
predecessors, successors and even the Sovereign herself. The Crown in this sense 
is more than merely a party ( or pa1iner), it is a trustee and source of justice. 
Clearly, however, the concept of the Crown conceals deep ambiguities. As Boston 
observes: 10 
One of the problematic features of the New Zealand system of 
government bas always been the role of the Crown. This has proved 
awkward with respect to Treaty of Waitangi issues, almost from the 
outset, and has been an element in thinking about constitutional 
change in recent times. 
The Crown means different things to different people. A number of terms are used 
to refer to the supreme authority within the community, such as the Crown, the 
government, the state and the Sovereign. Joseph refers to the terminological trap of 
Te Manutukutuku (newsletter of the Waitangi Tribunal) March 1996, 3. 
J Boston S Levine E McLeay N Roberts New Zealand Under MMP - A New Politics? (Bridget 
Williams, Auck.land, 1996), 3 7. For an examination of the nature and ramifications of what is meant 
by the term 'the Crown' see J. Hayward, "In search of a Treaty partner - who or what is the Crown?", 
PhD dissertation, Department of Politics VUW 1995. 
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attributing legal personality to "the government" rather than "the Crown" or "the 
state" .11 
The Crown is, legally and in fact, the embodiment of executive government. It is 
an historical emanation from kingship that has evolved in accordance with (as Lord 
Simon put it [in Town Investments v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 
at 397]) "the contemporary situation". But it is "the Crown", not "the government", 
that has legal existence. 
Those ambiguities will have significant implications for a constitutional system where 
Parliament is more important than it bas been before. There is a temptation for the 
concept of the Crown to become linked solely to the government of the day, rather 
than to the New Zealand state. 12 
The imp01iance of distinguishing the Crown from the government, or cabinet, lies in 
the new prominence of Parliament, and in the fact that the Crown is an ongoing 
fiduciary party to the Treaty relationship in a sense that transcends the political 
motives and agenda of the government of the day. This is not to down-play the ve1y 
real sense in which the government represents the Crown in its dealings, but instead 
recognises the ongoing nature and responsibilities of the Crown as the legal 
personification of the state and the community itself. 13 
As will be seen below, the composition of governments elected under a MMP 
electoral system will be different to first-past-the-post ("FPP") elected governments. 
Further, in an environment where the composition of governments may become more 
11 P Joseph above n 7, 129. See also Dr D L Mathieson QC "Does the Crown have human powers" 
(1992) 15 NZULR 117. 
12 
13 
M Mahuika makes the point that "[to] a large extent the obligation incumbent on the Government 
(whether the Crown or the State) are roughly the same in each case. From different perceptions of the 
way that the relationship between the Government and indigenous people has been conceptualised, is 
derived a common underlying theme. That theme is the necessity to protect the interests of indigenous 
people": "The Crown as a fiduciary in its dealings with indigenous peoples", LL.M. research paper, 
VUW, 1994. 
P Joseph, above n 7, 128. 
14 
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fluid than in the past, the integrity and continuity of a concept of the Crown which 
is inclusive of Parliament and embodies the state and central government has much 
to recommend it. 
III DEFINITION OF MAORI 
The English text of the Treaty provided that the Maori signatories were the "Chiefs 
of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand". The Maori text read as 
follows: "Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu 
Tirani". The parties to the Treaty in 1840 were the British Crown and the hapu ( sub-
tribes ). 14 There is only one use of the word iwi in the Treaty itself, a reference to 
the subjects of the Queen already living in the country and of others yet to 
immigrate. 15 It would, however, be inaccurate to consider the present relationship to 
be one between the Crown and hapu alone. The modem relationship between the 
Crown and Maori is significantly more complex. 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 defines "Maori" for the purposes of the Act to 
mean "a person of the Maori race of New Zealand; and includes any descendant of 
such a person". Section 6 empowers the Waitangi Tribunal to consider claims 
"[ w ]here any Maori claims that be or she, or any group of Maoris of which he or she 
is a member" is affected prejudicially by certain conduct inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty. 16 The Treaty of Waitangi Act contemplates not only a 
For an examination of Maori social organisation in the nineteenth century see J Belich Making People -
A Histo1y of the New Zealanders (Penguin, 1996), 83-86. 
15 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua and ors. v The Treaty ofWaitangi Fisheries Commission and ors. (the urban 
Maori fisheries allocation case.) , C.A. 155/95 , 30 April 1996 at 28 per Lord Cooke of Thomdon. 
16 The Government has proposed an amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act to allow the Waitangi 
Tribunal to decline to hear claims not mandated by hapu or iwi: Crown Proposals for the Settlement 
of Treaty of Waitangi Claims - Detailed Proposals (Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, 1994) 33. 
The submissions received on this issue were "mixed". Some favoured the proposal as protecting 
majority interests, others regarded it as inconsistent with the Treaty and a bureaucratic imposition. 
Report of Submissions (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 1995), 92-93. 
17 
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relationship between groups of Maori, such as the whanau, hapu and iwi, and the 
Crown but between individual Maori and the Crown also. 17 
For the purposes of this study I shall use, unless the context requires otherwise, a 
"cultural" definition of "Maori" to represent those people who consider themselves 
to be Maori and who are generally recognised as so being by other people. I do so 
on the basis that, notwithstanding definitional difficulty, the definition is consistent 
with both social reality and popular usage. 18 
IV THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
A Manifestations of the Relationship 
The relationship between the Crown and Maori is both complex and dynamic. Mami 
enjoy a special relationship with the Crown, in addition to their rights and 
responsibilities as New Zealand citizens. Maori may for example elect whether to 
register on the general electoral roll, or on the Maori roll for electoral purposes. An 
obvious manifestation of this special relationship is the substantial number of 
statutory or government-created bodies established to provide services to, and 
promote the interests of, Mami. These include Te Puni Kokiri (the Ministry of 
Maori Development), the New Zealand Maori Arts and Crafts Institute, the Mami 
Land Court, the Maori Language Commission, the Maori Purposes Fund Board, the 
For an examination of the various definitions of "Maori" and their apparent ramifications see J McGuire 
"Reflections on the formal definitions of Maori" [1995] NZLJ 168. 
18 
See R Pool Te Iwi Maori (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1991) for a considered examination 
of the difficulties involved in attempting to determine who is a Maori . 
19 
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Maori Trust Office, the Maori Appellate Court and the Waitangi Tribunal. 19 There 
are also many Maori interest groups which deal with the Crown. 
The relationship is capable of expression at a number of levels, ranging from the 
dealings of individual Maori with state agencies (such as schools and hospitals for 
example) to negotiations between the government and pan-Maori organisations, iwi 
and hapu. The matters which may be at issue between the pa1iies are equally diverse 
and cover the whole spectrum of the state's activities. 
B The Treaty of Waitangi 
1 The academic literature 
The Treaty of Waitangi has been acknowledged by the courts, Maori, academics and 
successive governments as the foundation document of New Zealand. The meaning, 
impmi and implications of the Treaty are at the very heart of the relationship 
between the Crown, Maori and all New Zealanders and will, without doubt, continue 
to be of great importance in the era of MMP. 
I do not, however, propose to traverse those issues in this paper other than to 
recognise the fundamental importance of the Treaty and refer the reader to sources 
where the issues have been discussed in far more detail than the constraints of this 
paper allow. 20 As I have stated above, this paper seeks to consider the impacts that 
In addition to these entities, there are a large number of quangos, committees and other bodies which 
focus on Maori issues. For example, the New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Education Unit of the 
Education and Training Suppon Agency, the Maori Ethnological Research Board, the Maori Health 
Advisory Committee, the Maori Health Group of the Ministry of Health, the Maori Heritage Council 
and the Maori Group of the Ministry of Education. The Direcro,y of Official Information, (Ministry 
of Justice , Wellington, 1995). 
See for example: R Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal - Conscience of the Nation or Just Another Court?" 
(1993) 16 Univ NSW LR 223; E Durie "The Tribunal and the Treaty" (1995) 25 VUWLR 97; E France 
"Administrative Law Duty or Treaty Obligation? - the Present Landscape", paper for AIC conference, 
April 1996; Sir Kenneth Keith "The Roles of the Tribunal, the Courts and the Legislature" (1995) 25 
VUWLR 129; C Trotter "The Struggle for Sovereignty" New Zealand Political Review (May 1995); C 
Archie Maori Sovereignty-A Pakeha Perspective (Hodder, Auckland, 1995); J Belich Making Peoples 
- A History of the New Zealanders (Penguin, 1996); R Boast "The Law and Maori" in Spiller P Finn 
2 l 
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MMP may have on Maori and the Crown, and to examine the evolving relationship 
between the Crown and Maori. An examination of issues of sovereignty and self-
determination falls beyond the scope of this work. 
2 The ''fiscal envelope" 
The Treaty has assumed a new prominence since the mid 1980s with the attempts of 
governments to settle Treaty of Waitangi claims. This has been, in my view, the 
most important facet of the Crown-Maori relationship in recent years. The National 
Government's release of the Crown's proposals for the settlement of Treaty of 
Waitangi claims (the so-called "fiscal envelope")21 on 8 December 1994 was greeted 
with a hostile response from Maori. That hostility was articulated by Maori 
throughout the country at the consultative regional hui which followed in the autumn 
of 1995. 22 Ma01i were critical of the Government's lack of consultation, the amount 
which had been set aside for the resolution of claims, the policies which motivated 
the proposals and the substance of the proposals themselves. 
J and Boast RA New Zealand Legal History (Brooker ' s, Wellington, 1995); P Cleave The Sovereignty 
Game (VUW, Wellington, 1990); Sir Hugh Kawharu Waitangi - Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the 
T/eaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992); J Kelsey A Question of Honour?: 
Labour and the Treaty (Allen & Un win, Wellington, 1990); J Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Williams, 
Wellington, 1993); C Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987), P G 
McHugh The Maori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland 1991); H Melbourne Maori 
Sovereignty - The Maori Perspective (Hodder, Auckland, 1995); R Mulgan Maori, Pakeha and 
Democracy (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989); Sir Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution 
in Crisis (Mclndoe, Wellington 1992); W Renwick The Treaty Now (GP Books, Wellington , 1990); R 
Vasil Biculturalism - Reconciling Aotearoa within New Zealand (VUW, Wellington, 1988); A Sharp 
Justice and the Maori (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990); P Spiller, J Finn, and R Boast A 
New Zealand Legal History (Brooker ' s, Wellington, 1995). 
The fiscal envelope (or, more correctly, the 'settlement envelope ' ), was merely part of a series of 
detailed proposals which dealt with issues of claimants and their representation; the negotiations process , 
the protection mechanism for surplus Crown land, redress and issues concerning the conservation estate, 
natural resources, gifted lands, the settlement process and Crown expectations. The envelope itself was 
a funding device, intended by the Government to ensure that the $1 ,000 million was acceptable to the 
community, affordable for the Government, durable in terms of settlements and viable or sufficient for 
claimants. 
For an account of the background to the exercise by the then Chief Executive of Te Puni Kokiri see 
W Gardiner's Return to Sender (Reed, Auckland, 1996). 
23 
24 
13 
The debate generated by the fiscal envelope indicates the depth of feeling that the 
Treaty evokes in New Zealanders, both Maori and pakeha, the intractability and 
complexity of the issues, and their ability to dominate the political agenda. Further, 
the exercise showed in a very powerful way the difficulty of attempting to disengage 
issues of sovereignty, self-determination and the status of the Treaty from the 
resolution of Treaty grievances. The satisfactory resolution of individual Treaty of 
Waitangi claims will not result in a shift of focus away from Treaty issues. 23 
Nevertheless, the settlement of Treaty claims will, for the first time, enable the 
parties to the Treaty to deal with issues of self determination, kawanatanga and 
rangatiratanga without the painful and debilitating distraction of unresolved 
grievances.24 
3 The settlement of Treaty claims under MMP 
One of the most interesting aspects of the MMP era will be the way in which Treaty 
settlements are dealt with. The settlement of Treaty claims under FPP has essentially 
involved only the Crown and Ma.mi, with Parliament having but a peripheral role to 
play, to the extent that it was involved at all. The actual negotiation of the 
settlements on the part of the Crown will continue to be an act of the Executive. 
Nevertheless, under MMP the settlement of Treaty grievances will be much more 
dependent on the support of Parliament and, as a result of the proportionality of the 
new electoral system, the electorate at large. 
In the past the government was able to rely on dominance in caucus and in 
Parliament to ensure that any legislation necessary for the resolution of Treaty claims 
proceeded smoothly, and that the necessary funds were supplied. Further, the 
government chaired the Maori Affairs, Justice and Law Reform, and Finance and 
Expenditure select committees which considered the legislation implementing 
I am grateful to Dr Matthew Palmer for bringing this point to my attention. 
It is notable that claimants continued to engage the Government in negotiations throughout the fiscal 
envelope exercise and afterwards, while nonetheless rejecting the proposals or substantial elements of 
them. 
14 
settlements, such as the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, and the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, or legislation which 
refen-ed to the Treaty or its principles, and reviewed the relevant budgetary 
an-angements. 
Not all settlements reqmre legislation, although the larger and more complex 
settlements, such as Tainui, have done. Those which do will be subject to the shift 
in the legislative initiative to Parliament and to the potentially more rigorous role of 
the select committees. Those settlements which do not require legislation will still 
be subject to the scrutiny function of the committees. In my view the continued 
viability of meaningful efforts to resolve Treaty grievances is no longer dependent 
on the policies of the government. Instead, they will be subject, for better or worse, 
to Parliament and the electorate its members represent. 
In a more basic sense the initiative and boundaries for the settlement of Treaty claims 
and the debate of Treaty issues may shift. The orthodox view of the Crown's 
constitutional relationship with Maori, as set out in a paper for the National Cabinet 
in September 1995 below, is subject to change. 25 
Any constitutional discussion with Maori will lead to the subjects of sovereignty and 
political representation .... [However] there is no justification or benefit in demands 
that the sovereignty of Parliament be weakened in response to claims of te tino 
rangatiratanga under the Treaty of Waitangi. The view of the Waitangi Tribunal and 
the Court of Appeal is that the Treaty does, however, justify specific involvement 
of tangata whenua in responsibility and control of their own affairs in concert with 
the Crown. 
The Crown, represented by the government of the day, might no longer be the 
predominant actor in Treaty issues. MMP-elected Parliaments have the potential to 
25 CSC(95)159 - Crown/Maori Governance Issues. Released by Te Puni Kokiri to the writer under the 
Official Information Act on 28 June 1996. For details of the policy behind the Crown's proposals see 
Policy Papers for Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims, released generally 
by the Office of Treaty Settlements under the Official Information Act on 3 March 1995. 
15 
become the focus, not for the settlement of individual claims, but for issues of 
gene1ic Treaty policy and, perhaps broader debate upon issues of sovereignty and 
self-determination. In the words of Sir Geoffrey Palmer: 26 
The relatively greater importance of Parliament compared to the Executive that may 
exist under MMP compared with what the recent experience has been could well 
alter the balance on Maori issues, and do so in a way that we have yet to properly 
discern. 
C Partnership 
The relationship created by the signing of the Treaty may be expressed in many 
ways, Undoubtedly the most evocative and influential expression of the relationship 
is to be found in the judgment of Cooke P, as he then was, in the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General. 27 His Honour 
held that: 28 
The Treaty signified a partnership between the races, and it is in this concept that 
the answer to the present case is to be found .... 
What has already been said amounts to an acceptance of the submission for the 
applicants that the relationship between the Treaty partners creates responsibilities 
analogous to fiduciary duties. 
Within a sho1i time of the decision having been issued the concept of pa11nership 
became inextricably linked to discussions concerning the Treaty. Kawharu observes 
that, unlike the catchwords of the past (such as assimilation, biculturalism and 
integration), the concept of Treaty partners and pa11nership was distinguishable for 
26 Correspondence with the writer, 27 August 1996. 
27 [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
28 Above n 27, at 664. 
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being tied directly to the Treaty itself and being based on "a dyadic relationship" of 
good faith, honour and mutual obligation.29 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in the first Maori Council case remams 
instructive in any consideration of the nature of the relationship. Richardson J 
refe1Ted to the relationship as follows: 30 
... there is every reason for attributing to both partners [the] obligation to deal with 
each other and with their Treaty obligations in good faith. That must follow from 
both the nature of the compact and its continuing application in the life of New 
Zealand and from its provisions. No less than under the settled principles of equity 
as under our partnership laws, the obligation of good faith is necessarily inherent in 
such a basic compact as the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Somers J refe1Ted to the principles of sincerity and good faith, and held that it was 
upon those principles that the Crown entered into the Treaty. His Honour said that 
each party owed the other a duty of good faith, like the kind of duties civil law 
parties owe inter se. 31 Casey J described the relationship in similar terms: 32 
I have spoken of what I perceive to be a relationship akin to a partnership between 
the Crown and Maori people, and of its obligation on each side to act in good faith. 
The President of the Court of Appeal subsequently employed the concept of 
partnership in numerous decisions. 33 Nonetheless the use of the word "partnership" 
29 I H Kawharu Waitangi - Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) xii. 
30 [1987] 1 NZLR 641, at 682. 
31 Bisson J preferred to describe the relationship between the Crown and Maori as that of parties to the 
Treaty rather than partners, above n 30, at 714. 
32 Above n 30, 704. 
33 See for example: NZ Maori Council v A-G [ 1989] 2 NZLR 142 at 152; Tainui Maori Trust Board v 
A-G [1989] 513 at 527 and 529; Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v A-G [1990] 2 NZLR 641 at 654; A-G 
v NZ Maori Council [1991] 2 NZLR 129 at 132; and Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu v A-G [1993] 
17 
can be misleading. The judgments of the Court of Appeal do not envisage a full 
relationship between the Crown and Maori as equals.34 The relationship between the 
Crown and Maori is a relationship in the nature of a partnership, rather than a 
partnership per se. The decisions are careful to qualify the "analogy" (as Cooke P 
described the notions of partnership and fiduciary obligation in Te Runanga o 
Muriwhenua v A-G35). The judges of the Court of Appeal have, for example, sought 
to describe the nature of the relationship in the following terms: "signified a 
partnership"; "the kind of duty which civil law partners owe each other"; "a 
relationship akin to a partnership"; and the use of the term "parties" rather than 
"partners" .36 The Court of Appeal neither explicitly recognises nor, as I see it, 
envisages, any form of shared sovereignty between the parties. 
From the perspective of the Crown, partnership appears to involve incorporating 
Maori input into decision making, both at a local and a national level, and, 
importantly, devolution of responsibility for the delivery of government services to 
Maori. Recent governments have shied away from addressing Maori political issues 
and ambitions such as sovereignty and self determination, and have sought instead 
to address issues of Maori development and dependency. The return of resources to 
Maori was intended not only to settle Treaty claims, but to enhance the opportunities 
for Ma01i enterprise. It was believed that the return of resources to Maori would 
reduce the level of Maori reliance on state support; lead to savings in health, 
education, welfare and housing; and foster greater participation by Maori in the 
economy as a whole.37 
2 NZLR 301 at 304. 
34 
See for example the dicta of Cooke Pin NZ Maori Council v A-G [1989] 2 NZLR 142 at 152 and 
Tainui Maori Trust Board v A-G [1989] 513 at 527. 
35 [1990] 2 NZLR 641 at 655. 
36 
I am grateful to the Hon Douglas Graham M.P. for sharing with the writer his conceptualisation of the 
nature of the Treaty relationship. 
37 
J Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Williams, Wellington, 1993) p 260. See also M Horton "The Rise of 
Maori Capitalism" New Zealand Monthly Review, November-December 1993, 14-16. 
18 
For the fourth Labour Government, the enactment of the short lived Runanga Iwi Act 
1990 was an attempt to both recognise the traditional importance of iwi and empower 
them to contract with the Crown for the delivery of government services to iwi. It 
was envisaged that the Crown and iwi would be contractual partners, reflecting to 
some extent the Maori view of rangatiratanga. The National Opposition attacked the 
bill on the basis that the mechanism for the delivery of partial independence to iwi 
was flawed, setting tribe against tribe, and that it represented a paternalist and 
socialist approach. 38 
The Runanga Iwi Act was repealed by the incoming National Government within 
months of taking office. The National party manifesto of 1990 contained a promise 
to settle all proven Treaty of Waitangi claims by the tum of the century. The Bolger 
Government took what can perhaps best be described as a pragmatic approach to 
achieving its ends, dealing with pan-Maori organisations, trust boards, iwi, hapu and 
even individual whanau. 39 
For Maori, however, talk of devolution and Crown principles missed the point. The 
relationship created by the signing of the Treaty was no less than one of full sharing 
of power and resources. Whereas previously Maori bad been dependent on what they 
could receive from the goodwill of the Crown and pakeha, the recognition of the 
Treaty in the mid-1980s required the fulfilment of all their guaranteed and inherent 
rights flowing from it. Devolution based on the governmental control of iwi was 
seen to be both repressive and to smack of paternalism. 40 Yet in barely a decade 
Maori bad moved from the margins to the mainstream. While the relationship was 
demonstrably not one of partnership, both parties were at least evaluating the nature 
and ramifications of the relationship as they had not had cause to do before. 
38 NZPD, 1989, Volume 503, 14228-14244. 
39 The latter in relation to the settlement of the Wairnakuku claim of the Baker whanau in December 1995. 
40 A Fleras and J Elliott The Nations Within - Aboriginal State Relations in Canada, the United States, 
and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1992) 204-218. 
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If nothing else, the debate arising from the judicial recognition of the Treaty has 
revealed the relationship between the Crown and Maori to be robust and enduring, 
yet dependent on the good faith and participation of both sides. 
V THE NATURE OF THE MMP POLITICAL SYSTEM 
A Components of the Political System 
The decision of New Zealand electors in the spring of 1993 to move from a first past 
the post electoral system to a mixed-member proportional electoral system has 
significant ramifications for the operation of government and for the development of 
public policy. Before considering the likely effects of an MMP environment on the 
parties to the Treaty it is helpful to consider briefly the broader consequences of 
electoral reform. 
It is important to remember at the outset that the electoral system is just one 
constituent element of the political and governmental environment. Equally 
important are the other related components: the form of the constitution; the role of 
the courts; the procedures of Parliament; the operation of the Executive; and the 
political parties. The changes which emerge after the first MMP election (and those 
discernable before then, in the conduct of the forty-fourth Parliament) are not all 
simply the result of the Electoral Act 1993. Many factors influence the workings of 
a political system, of which the form of the electoral system is but one. 
Colin James, writing before the referendum and general election in 1993, argued 
that: 41 
Moving to MMP [is] an important constitutional change. But there have been more 
important ones in the past five years: the elevation of the Treaty of Waitangi to 
constitutional status and the "founding document of our nation" is the most 
41 C James and A McRobie Turning Point - the 1993 Election and Beyond (Williams, Wellington, 1993) 
136. 
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profound; the Reserve Bank Act in 1989, handing over the control of inflation to the 
Reserve Bank, was a very important shift of power. Some argue that the reforms 
of the state sector have profoundly altered the way Government business is done. 
Without wishing to diminish the significance of the changes to which James refers, 
I consider that he underestimates the importance of the adoption of an MMP electoral 
system. The changes resulting from MMP will be prove to be much more 
fundamental. The move to MMP has become more than simply an issue of how 
Members of Parliament are elected. It represents broad political reform of a 
magnitude which is rare in this country.42 
Some changes are the result of trends which in all likelihood would have continued 
to ocGur even without a change to the electoral system. While it is useful to attempt 
to distinguish the direct effects of the move to an MMP electoral system, it would 
be misleading to disengage MMP entirely from broader social and political trends. 
For example, as the New Zealand electorate became more polarised and pluralistic 
in the last two decades there was already evidence of a trend away from a parliament 
dominated by two large parties. Not even the constraints of FPP were sufficient to 
prevent politics taking an increasingly multi-party shape. Even so, MMP is more 
than merely a consequence of other factors, it "will generate outcomes of its own".43 
B Political Culture 
( The move to a system of proportional representation marks a turning point in New 
Zealand's development as a Westminster-descended democracy based on the FPP 
electoral system. The most dramatic change will be in the composition of the House 
of Representatives itself. In recent decades Parliament has been dominated by two 
42 But not unprecedented. It may fairly be compared with the election of the Liberal Government of 1893, 
the early years of the first Labour Government of 193 5-1949, and the reforms of the fourth Labour 
Government and the subsequent National Government of 1990-1996. Changes to the voting system 
were also made in 1908 to require a second ballqt if no candidate in the first ballot received more than 
50% of the vote. It was changed back in time ' ofthe 1914 election. 
43 J Vowles et al Towards Consensus? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995) 195. 
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large parties, with minor parties holding only a very small number of seats. In an 
MMP-elected Parliament a greater number of parties, perhaps 4-7,44 may be expected 
to be represented on a regular basis. As will be seen below, coalition governments 
are more likely. 
It is less certain whether the changes to the way in which Parliament and the 
government operate will be accompanied by a change in the political expectations 
and behaviour of the electorate. The form of the electoral system itself influences 
the type and nature of parties seeking representation, the way in which the parties 
, inter- relate, how they select their candidates and the expectations electors have of 
them. 45 Electors, both Maori and pakeha, may well take some time to recognise and 
adapt to the exigencies of the new environment, and re-visit their expectations. 
Under FPP electors could vote a party into government and hold that party directly 
accountable for its pe1formance. MMP makes representation the central issue, with 
the demarcation and distribution of power flowing as a consequence of the 
distribution of representation.46 Under MMP electors will in effect vote for the 
legislature, which will itself determine the executive, instead of effectively voting for 
the executive directly as under FPP.47 Electors will retain the ability to express their 
dissatisfaction with that allocation of power at a subsequent election, although in my 
view the direct link between the electorate and the Government through the ballot 
box will be weakened. In the final analysis, the stability and evolution of the 
political system is dependent on the conduct of members of Parliament and, most 
importantly, of the electors they represent. 
44 Above n 41, 201. 
45 R Mulgan "Political culture" in G Hawke (ed.) Changing Politics - the Electoral Referendum 1993 
(Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1993) 43. 
46 P Cowen et al An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Change in New Zealand (New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, Wellington, 1992) 3.24. 
47 A Bollard The Economic Consequences of Electoral Reform Discussion Paper No. 38 (NZ Institute of 
Economic Research, Wellington, 1993) 13. 
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C Economic Consequences 
The relationship between the Crown and Maori does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
influenced by a number of external factors. One of the most significant of those 
factors is the economic environment the parties find themselves in. It has been 
postulated that the choice of an MMP electoral system may have marked economic 
consequen es, which in turn would have repercussions for the parties to the Treaty, 
particufurly the Crown. 
One likely consequence of MMP is an increased number of coalition governments. 
It may be more difficult for coalition governments to exercise rigorous 'fiscal 
responsibility'. This is because individual parties to the coalition are likely to 
repres·ent groups or constituencies with distinct sectoral interests. This may hamper 
the government's ability to make difficult budgetary decisions in respect of those 
interests, with a consequential effect on the budget as a whole and the financial 
position of the Crown. 
Similarly, cooperative outcomes reached by coalitions may be less durable where the 
coalition atTangement is unstable. It has also been argued that Westminster systems 
are more likely to link spending decisions with revenue decisions than proportional 
systems. Yet there is no proven nexus between a lack of fiscal discipline and the 
form of a country's political system. International comparisons may well be 
inappropriate for New Zealand in light of the enhanced transparency which has been 
brought to the budgetary process by the Public Finance Act 1989, the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994, and the national accounts' conformance with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices set by the Accounting Stanqards Review Board.48 
Another clear consequence of MMP is that interest groups, including those concerned 
with Maori issues, should enjoy improved access to the decision making process. 
Lobbyists will have greater opportunities to influence the outcome of policy, either 
48 State Services Commission Working Under Proportional Representation - A Referen ce for the Public 
Service (SSC, Wellington, 1995) 56-57. 
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by way of select committees, the Opposition, or a government coalition member.49 
It is less clear whether the greater number of parties represented in Parliament under 
M:MP will cause a change to traditional patterns of negotiation and compromise over 
policy. Even so, it is unlikely that there will be a radical change to the fundamentals 
of economic and fiscal policy. Indeed it may well be that the reforms of the late 
1980s and early 1990s are "locked in". As Roger Kerr bas observed, electoral 
systems have rarely been a factor of over-riding importance in the economic history 
of most countries. Changes in economic thinking and experience, and the choices 
of countries about the role and scope of government have been much more 
important. 50 
VI THE IMPLICATIONS OF MMP FOR THE CROWN 
A The Form of Government 
M:MP will effect notable change on the formation and characteristics of government 
in New Zealand. For decades single party majority governments have dominated 
New Zealand politics. But they are not the only form of Cabinet government, as 
overseas experience reveals. Governments may be categorised according to whether 
they have the support of a majority or minority of the members of Parliament, and 
whether they represent one party or a coalition of parties. There are accordingly four 
types of government possible: 
(i) single party majority government; 
(ii) multi-party ( or coalition) majority government; 
(iii) multi-party minority government; 
49 A Bollard, above n 47 , 25-27. 
50 Roger Kerr "Public Policy Making Under MMP" speech to the IIR Conference on Public Affairs and 
Lobbying, Wellington, 21 February 1995. See also, Roger Kerr "Vision 20/20: Directions for New 
Zealand - Reflections on Electoral Reform" NZ Business Roundtable, Auckland, 22 June 1993, 9-10. 
24 
(iv) single party minority government. 
It is improbable, but not impossible, that a single party would win more than 50% 
of the vote in the current political environment. 51 A party need not necessarily win 
50% of the vote in order to obtain a majority in the House, as some parties will not 
achieve the 5% threshold. At least 46-47% of the list vote would still be necessary 
in order to secure a majority in the House - levels of support which are historically 
uncommon in this country.52 It is therefore most likely that future governments will 
either be coalitions, either majority or minority, or single party minorities. 
At this point one should be careful to distinguish between the four types of 
government referred to above. Minority governments, whether coalitions or not, have 
been found to be less durable than other forms of government, and are often found 
in political systems where parties are fractionalised. Whether parties in this country 
will move towards a new consensus, become even further atomised, or settle down 
into several broad groupings is the subject of speculation. The Cabinets which result 
from minority governments can be unstable and less effective in compa1ison with 
majority governments. This is because they are more exposed to the risk of defeat 
in the House and lack the authority and weight of support needed to tackle 
contentious issues. 53 
Nonetheless, minority governments are common in other jurisdictions (especially in 
Scandinavia) and can operate effectively. The successful operation of minority 
governments requires experience on the part of those who operate under them. 
Where minority governments are rare they are less likely to perfo1m satisfacto1ily. 
51 Before the National-United coalition of 1996 (and the previous arrangements entered into by the Bolger 
Government and former National MPs) there had not been any form of coalition government in New 
Zealand since that of Peter Fraser during the Second World War, and no true coalition since 1928-1935. 
52 J Boston"The future of cabinet government in New Zealand: the implications of MMP for the 
formation , organisation and operations of the cabinet" (VUW Graduate School of Business and 
Government Management, Wellington, 1994) 3. 
53 Above n 47, 16-17. 
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Similarly, coalition governments have been thought to be "unhealthy and ineffective". 
Additional pressures are exerted where a government consists of a coalition of 
various parties. The convention of collective responsibility in particular can be 
strained by the normal debate involved in developing policy between different parties 
in coalition. Coalition governments are normally careful to ensure that such debate 
is not perceived to be divisive or de-stabilising. 
( While it is very difficult to predict the future composition of New Zealand 
governments elected under a mixed-member proportional electoral system, it appears 
likely that coalitions will become more common. ) In the debate before the two 
referenda on proportional representation M.MP became almost synonymous with 
government by coalition. It is yet to be seen whether this will be borne out in the 
years ahead. What is clear is that the way in which the Crown, as the executive, 
governs will be influenced profoundly by the way in which it is composed. The 
Crown can no longer be assumed to command the dominant position that it has 
enjoyed in recent decades. As will be seen, this is liable to have significant 
implications for the nature and conduct of the relationship between the Crown and 
Maori. 
Strom summarises his research into the track records of minority and coalition 
governments in office as follows: 54 
The analysis of minority government performance leaves us with a surprisingly 
favourable impression of these cabinets. To be sure, undersized governments tend 
to be somewhat less durable than majority coalitions and the participating parties are 
more likely to be replaced in subsequent cabinet transitions. On the other hand, 
minority government enjoy substantial advantages in electoral success and are less 
likely to resign in traumatic circumstances. Clearly, minority governments are in 
most respects inferior to single party minority cabinets ... 
54 
K Strom Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) 129. 
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However, he continues: 55 
Majority coalitions should be preferred only by parties that are strongly office 
motivated. Policy-seeking and especially vote-seeking parties might well find 
minority governments to be a more attractive option. The more government stability 
a potential governing party is willing to trade off for policy effectiveness and 
electoral advantage the more inclined it will be to opt for a minority cabinet. 
Regardless of the actual form of governments elected by MMP, Parliament will have 
much greater potential to determine the composition, and perhaps less directly, the 
operation of the government. 
B The Role and Function of Cabinet 
The role of the Cabinet will be affected by a Parliament elected on the basis of 
proportional representation. Cabinet government will remain, but its nature and 
operation could change. Any such changes are important to Maori, as they directly 
affect the ability of the Crown, in the form of the Cabinet, to formulate and advance 
its policies. Boston observes that a move from a single party majority government 
to a minority government would fetter the ability of the Cabinet to pursue policies 
which would not be supported by parties holding the balance of power in Parliament. 
This would lead to much more consultation over policy between the parties than has 
previously been the case. 
But the internal operation of the Cabinet itself may be largely unaffected. 56 Cabinet 
will remain the pre-eminent decision-maker. It should be remembered that not all 
policies require legislation to be implemented. The search for non-legislative 
solutions to issues of public policy, and equally for issues of concern to Maori, will 
intensify. 
55 Above n 54, 130. 
56 J Boston, above n 52, 7. 
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The representation of minority groups might be enhanced. Boston makes the point 
that: 57 
... it is likely that the party leaders in a coalition government would use their 
influence to ensure that the cabinet's overall composition is suitably representative. 
There may also be increased pressures under MMP for the inclusion of Maori and 
perhaps Pacific Island MPs in the cabinet. 
If the government consists of a coalition matters are complicated by the need to 
allocate Cabinet positions to the members of the coalition and to reconcile their 
various different perspectives within the bounds of collective responsibility. If, for 
example, a party were to emerge which promoted "pro-Maori" policies, it might wish 
to be allocated the position of Minister of Maori Affairs in return for supporting a 
coalition government. The roles of the various Cabinet committees58 could change 
and the trend towards an inner Cabinet consisting of the members of the powerful 
Cabinet Strategy Committee could weaken. There may be a relaxation m the 
unanimity and confidentiality of Cabinet also. The danger would be if the 
convention of collective responsibility were to break down and members of a 
coalition government were to find political expediency in disowning or second 
guessing contentious decisions made by the coalition Cabinet. 59 
Harris and McLeay observe that most ministerial decisions will continue to be 
unilateral ones, as a government cannot function unless ministers have a considerable 
degree of discretion to make the large number of decisions which arise in their 
portfolios. They add that the convention of collective responsibility may in fact be 
strengthened in coalition Cabinets, as to ignore it would be to cast doubt on the 
57 J Boston, above n 52, 125. 
58 Of which there were roughly a dozen under the Bolger Government (APH, CIE, CIS, CSC, ECR, ETE, 
IPR, LEG, TOW, SDE, SPC, STA, and WAG). 
59 A Bollard The Economic Consequences of Electoral Reform, above n 47, 27 and 30. 
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viability of the government itself. In some European countries disagreements on 
issues of policy can be referred to a special Cabinet committee for determination.60 
The danger of the convention of collective responsibility breaking down may be 
mitigated by the establishment of new coordination mechanisms, to complement the 
existing bureaucratic ones. For example, in Germany and Ireland senior coalition 
MPs meet every week to identify and address potential difficulties before Cabinet 
meets. Political coordinators based in the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet or the Office of the P1ime Minister ( or the Deputy Prime Minister) could 
perform a similar role. It will no doubt take some time for such procedures to 
develop in New Zealand, and their shape will depend entirely on the nature of the 
government in question.61 
C The Relationship with Parliament 
As in the past, the relationship between the Crown and Parliament will continue to 
be of great importance when conside1ing the Crown's relationship with other parties. 
The primary instrument for the execution and implementation of the decisions of 
government is legislation. It follows that the ability to enact policy has been the key 
test of government authority. In the past governments have taken their legislative 
pre-eminence very seriously. The move to MMP presages a shift in the legislative 
initiative from the executive to the legislature. 
The direct changes to Parliament as a result of MMP will perhaps be less significant 
than the changes to the composition and operation of the government. The functions 
60 P Harris and E McLeay "The Legislature" in G Hawke (ed) Changing Politics - The Electoral 
Referendum 1993 (VUW, Wellington, 1993) 119-120. 
61 State Services Commission Working Under Proportional Representation - A Reference for the Public 
Service, above n 48, 18. 
62 
63 
29 
of Parliament will remain largely the same,62 although the ability of Parliament to 
perform those functions is likely to improve with the greater number of MPs 
available to service select committee and the extra time that list MPs in particular 
will have to attend to their parliamentary duties. 63 
Once the government bas introduced legislation it will be subject to keener 
consideration by Parliament. While most legislation is uncontroversial, those bills 
which are politically contentious can expect to be examined more rigorously. This 
will be a test for minority governments in particular. 
If a minority government does not secure some form of support agreement from the 
other Parliamentary parties it must arrange a majority in the House for any bills it 
wishes to see proceed. Indeed, it may be obliged to attempt to secure the supp011 of 
different groups of MPs for each bill it introduces, depending on the issue in 
question. Nor could any government assume that a bill will necessarily emerge from 
the House in a recognisable form to that which was introduced. The p1ice of the 
improved ability to scrutinize and alter legislation while a bill is in the House is 
ce11ainty. 
The ability of MPs to promote members' bills will be enhanced. The greater use of 
members' bills by non-government members is likely to be a notable feature of an 
MMP-elected Parliament. Whereas in the past members ' bills which have lacked 
government support have languished before government-chaired select committees, 
they are now liable to find a more favourable environment as the control of the select 
committees is proportional to the representation of parties in Parliament. Bills must 
also be reported on within six months of being referred to a committee (unless the 
That is, to grant supply to the Government; and to scrutinise the activities of the executive. The 
legislative and scrutiny functions are now quite evenly balanced, with select committees spending 
roughly half their time considering legislation: Report of the Standing Orders Commiuee on the Review 
of Standing Orders (1995) AJHR 1.18A, 39. 
There may also be fewer bills in the House than was previously the case, allowing more time to spent 
on non-legislative work. Conversely it may allow legislation to be examined more thoroughly. 
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House grants an extension).64 If Maori MPs are not represented on the Treasury 
benches the use of members' bills by Maori MPs to advance their policies may be 
expected to increase. 
Similarly, the scrutiny functions of the House will be improved as select committees 
exert their new-found independence from government control. The desire of the 
committees to have greater access to information and advice, not only from 
government sources, will increase with the committees' desire to ensure greater 
accountability of Ministers, their departments, state-owned enterprises and other 
Crown agencies. 65 
The new standing orders are of particular imporiance for their effect on the 
procedures of the House and its committees. They will have some impact on the 
uneasy relationship between governments and the House. Chen argues that the new 
standing orders: 66 
... are likely to result in a lessening of executive control over the content of 
legislation passed by Parliament. The executive is likely to be forced to negotiate 
more about the content of legislation before it is introduced and parliamentary input 
into legislation may be higher than in the past. It is also likely that less legislation 
will be passed in MMP Parliaments than the large amounts of legislation passed in 
recent Parliaments. But there will be greater opportunities for what legislation is 
passed to be better scrutinized. 
64 so 284. 
65 
66 
State Services Commission "Working Under Proportional Representation" above n 48, 44. See also, 
Chen "The Introduction of MMP in New Zealand - the Implications for Lawyers" ( 1994) 5 PLR 104 
at 110. 
M Chen "Parliament and Law-making under MMP: the New Standing Orders" papers of the NZ Law 
Society conference in Dunedin, April 1996. See also "Parliament: Changing the Rules of the Game", 
in J Boston et al, above n 10, 67-91. 
67 
68 
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The Crown's relationship with Parliament bas substantial ramifications for Maori. 
One of the continuities of the relationship between Maori and the New Zealand state 
is, in the words of Richard Boast:67 
... the predominance of statute. The massive changes to Maori land tenure in the 
1860s were brought about by statute. The status of the Treaty of Waitangi always 
has been, and still is, dependent on the extent to which it is recognised in statute. 
The Waitangi Tribunal, too, is a creature of statute. One basic principle which has 
dominated the situation is not the common law of aboriginal title but, in fact , the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. There have been no fetters on Parliament's 
ability to pass legislation affecting Maori people, and as a result Maori land has been 
caught up in a jungle of statute for more than a century. 
Given the "predominance of statute" at the heart of the relationship between the 
Crown and Maori, the nature of interaction between the Crown and the legislature 
is of obvious importance. If a government, or any other MP for that matter, wishes 
to change statutory provisions which govern a certain aspect of the relationship a 
legislative amendment will be required. Similarly, if a government wishes to alter 
the jmisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal or Maori Land Court, or implement a Treaty 
settlement through an Act of Parliament,68 it will need the consent of a majority of 
MPs. If the relationship between the Crown and Parliament is to change in the ways 
that some commentators have posited there will be very significant implications for 
the way in which the Crown and Maori interact. 
D Comment 
It is important for each of the parties to the Treaty to understand the ways in which 
the other will change as a result of the new political environment. For the Crown 
the principal changes will be to the formation, organisation and operation of the 
R Boast "The Law and the Maori" in Spiller, Finn and Boast, A New Zealand Legal History (Brooker's, 
Wellington, 1995) 172-173. 
As in the case of the recent Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995. 
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Cabinet, and in the Crown's relationship with Parliament. These changes will in tum 
influence the Crown's relationship with Ma01i. The Crown will no longer dominate 
Parliament as it seemed to do in the past, nor will it operate in entirely the same 
ways. Where the Crown wishes to pass a bill which has implications for Maori, 
Maori will have a greater opportunity to influence the policy of the bill than has 
previously been the case. 
The trend in recent years of increasing openness and consultation can be expected 
to continue. Maori might better identify with the consultative or consensual approach 
to the development of policy envisaged by the proponents of MMP, than to the more 
explicitly polarised political environment of the past. The Crown will no doubt wish 
to involve Maori in the development of proposals before their introduction in order 
to maximise the chances of the bill being passed. 
In addition to increased representation in Parliament itself, discussed below, Maori 
will be able to lobby members of select committees, other MPs, as well as 
Opposition, government and coalition members. It should not be assumed, however, 
that improved access will necessarily result in more satisfactory outcomes for Maori, 
as other factors (such as the strength of the government ' s commitment to the 
measure, the differing views of other interest groups and MPs themselves, for 
example) will continue to influence the process. Nor should it be forgotten that the 
increased opportunities for involvement, however desirable and worthwhile, will be 
costly for Maori to exploit. I consider the Crown, as a fiduciary under the Treaty, 
to be subject to a duty to assist Maori in their participation in the new environment. 
How that duty ought best to be given effect to is an imp01iant issue of governance 
for the Crown. 
Where the Crown is uncertain of its ability to pass legislation without substantial 
amendment it will focus on the implementation of its policies by administrative rather 
than legislative means. By no means all policies affecting Maori require empowering 
legislation. While the Crown will still be subject to judicial review and to the 
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inquiry functions of select committees, it will undoubtedly seek to operate as 
autonomously as possible. 
Nonetheless, I have no doubt that Parliament has the potential to emerge as the 
prima1y forum for Maori to pursue and articulate their strategic aspirations. 
VII THE IMPLICATIONS OF MMP FOR MAORI 
A Kotahitanga 
At the same time as the Crown adapts to MMP, equally significant changes are in 
prospect for Maori. Politicians, officials and others have often voiced a desire for 
a single body to represent Ma01i and to consult with on issues arising from the 
relationship created by the Treaty. The election of MPs on the basis of an MMP 
electoral system may provide impetus for Maori to develop structures to take 
maximum advantage of the new opportunities which MMP presents. 
The search for Maori political unity, or a national representative body of some kind, 
is not a new one. In 1831 northern iwi formed the "United Tribes" in order to 
petition King William IV, which evolved into the "Confederation of United Tribes" 
four years later. The subsequent deterioration in relations with the settlers 
encouraged the creation of the Kingitanga movement in the Waikato in 1858.
69 The 
• 
early 1860s saw the establishment of hundreds of dist1ict runanga as a form of 
government regulation of Maori activity. One of the most significant developments 
in moves towards Maori unity was the holding of kotahitanga, or unity, "Parliament" 
(Paremata Maori) in Waipatu in Hawke's Bay in an attempt to respond to the policies 
of the colonial Parliament.
70 Developments in the early twentieth century include the 
centrally coordinated district councils provided for by the Maori Councils Act 1900, 
69 The Rev Marsden had suggested the concept of a Maori king as far back as June 1842. 
7° C James and A McRobie Turning Point - The 1993 Election and Beyond (Williams, Wellington, 1993) 
110. 
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and the Ratana movement of the mid 1920s which preached a movement away from 
tribalism towards unity as a people.71 
More recently, the Maori Women' s Welfare League (Te Ropu Wahine Maori Toko 
i Te Ora) was established by Awhina Cooper72 in September 1951. The League now 
has more than 220 branches and represents some 3500 Maori women. The League 
aims to address the social disadvantages of Maori women, increase their involvement 
in the community, promote health and parenting, develop Maori culture and 
contribute to the inclusion of their perspective in the development of government 
policy.73 
The New Zealand Maori Council was established in 1962 and consists of 13 district 
councils and a national council of 42 members. Its role is to promote Maori culture 
and the economic and social well-being of Maori , and is partly funded by 
government. While the Council has been a prominent and vigorous pariy in Treaty 
litigation, some Maori are unsupportive of the organisation and distrust it for being 
identified too closely with the govemment.74 
The most recent attempt at a pan-Maori representative forum is the Maori Congress 
(Te Whakakotahitanga o Nga Iwi o Aotearoa), which was established in 1990 as a 
forum for iwi to promote autonomous Maori development in the tradition of the 
kotahitanga movement. The Congress aims to foster Maori self-determination, 
monitor the activities of the Crown and articulate Maori views on a range of issues. 
71 L Cox Kotahitanga - The Search for Maori Political Unity (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993) 
110. 
72 Later Dame Whina Cooper. 
73 The League is politically influential and is seen as "a powerful proactive voice in both Maori and 
national affairs": L Cox. above n 71 , 114. 
74 J King "Who speaks for Maori" Evening Post 28 February 1995, 16. 
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The Congress consists of 45 mainly North Island iwi and is perceived to be 
independent of the Government. It has yet to realise its full potential.
75 
The search for a voice to represent Maori has taken many paths. One path, signified 
by the United Tribes Movement, was to pursue unity based on the structures of the 
tribes. A second approach was the development of iwi-derived structures imposed 
by the government ( an example of which was the Maori Councils Act 1900). A third 
approach emphasised the development of pan-Maori movements which focused on 
particular sectoral issues and non-tribal goals. Cox observes that such 
pan-Maori movements are a recent phenomenon, and adds that:
76 
[w]ith the demographic shift away from rural areas and the resultant diminution of 
traditional affiliations to ancestral territories, a distinct ethnic perception was 
developed by Maori. In an urban environment where contact not only by Europeans 
but also with Pacific Islanders, Asians and other tribal kinsmen is perhaps lessened, 
Maori can find common cause with other Maori comfoning. A clear link, then, 
between pan-tribal kotahitanga and increased urbanisation among Maori can be 
hypothesised. 
On the other hand, the vision of unity has been described as a "myth".
77 
It has been 
argued, with some accuracy, that Maori society is deeply divided on many issues and 
on several lines. For example, consider the vigorous debate between conservatives 
and radicals, urban and rural Ma01i, the rangatahi and the more senior members of 
the community and between iwi and hapu themselves.
78 
75 Above n 74, 16 
76 L Cox above n 71, 114. 
77 B Easton "Divided issues - how did the myth of the unified Maori originate?" The Listener 10 June 
1995 58. 
78 Above n 77, 58. 
79 
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MMP will influence the development and operation of p
an-Maori or iwi/hapu-based 
structures, just as earlier changes to the political environ
ment have influenced Maori 
over the past two centuries. 
B The Chance for Influence 
As noted above, the enhanced opportunity for Maori 
to influence the legislative 
process may provide impetus for organisational change 
for Maori groups, and offers 
the prospect of improved access to decision makers .
 There are three possible 
scenarios. 
First, iwi or hapu groups may find that it is more advan
tageous for them to operate 
independently in dealing with the Crown and Parliamen
t. If one effect of MMP is 
to improve the access and effect of interest groups then 
existing iwi-based structures 
or developments of them may be better suited to nego
tiating on their own behalf, 
rather than in pan-Maori organisations. Such an approac
h is likely to suit the larger 
iwi which possess the necessary organisational skills and
 resources to exploit the new 
opportunities. Those iwi or hapu which are distant from
 the capital and/or lack the 
ability to make their presence felt in a productive way 
would be at a considerable 
disadvantage. 
The emergence of numbers of well-organised iwi re
presenting and articulating 
primarily their own interests is consistent with moves by
 the Crown to empower iwi 
and to devolve service delivery functions. It does not, 
however, fit easily with the 
precepts of the kotahitanga movement and would ar
guably foster a climate of 
competition between iwi.
79 
A second scenario would see greater emphasis placed
 on pan-Maori movements 
which focus on particular sectoral interests or non-triba
l goals. This has been seen 
already in recent years with the trend towards plura
lism and volatility in the 
That sense of competition is not necessarily counter-prod
uctive, although the strength of existing inter-
iwi rivalry should not be discounted either. 
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electorate as a whole. Pan-Maori or Maori sectoral interest groups are a part of that 
trend and would be well placed to exploit the opportunities for access to decision 
makers open to lobbyists in an MMP environment. Maori organisations should have 
some advantages over other interest groups because there should be more Maori MPs, 
and pa1iies might be expected to have campaigned on policies which are more 
sympathetic to Ma01i aspirations. 
Equally, however, it is also possible that parties or interest groups may emerge with 
policies which represent the feeling of some segments of the electorate that the 
"Maori renaissance" has gone far enough.
80 If MMP is based on the principle of 
proportionality it raises the question of what the consequences would be if the unease 
felt by many non-Maori at the Crown's attempts to meet its moral and legal 
obligations under the Treaty were to be translated into significant representation in 
Parliament. 
The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario involves the integration of elements of 
the other two. Those iwi which possess the organisational ability, numbers and 
resources to operate effectively without substantial external assistance may be 
expected to prefer a path of autonomy and self-determination where that is consistent 
with their interests. Where it is expedient for them to deal with the Crown in order 
to achieve or promote a desired outcome, or if they wish to influence the progress 
of a legislative measure, those iwi can deal directly with the members and 
committees of Parliament, and the Crown and its agencies. Few iwi are yet in such 
a position. Most are, to varying degrees, obliged to deal with the Crown for the 
provision of social services or resources, or are still in the process of negotiation with 
the Crown for the settlement of their Treaty claims. 
80 J McGuire refers to a "growing wave of criticism and resentment" by those who do not receive the 
"advantages" apparently conferred by the Treaty. He argues that "they base their dissent on what is 
perceived to be unmerited and unfair favouritism of the state towards Maori", "Reflections on the 
formal definitions of Maori" [1995] NZLJ 168 at 172. Quare also the influence of revisionist books 
such as S Scott's The Travesty of Waitangi. 
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There will remain a very important place for a pan-Maori approach to dealing with 
the Crown. Pan-Maori organisations such as the Maori Women's Welfare League, 
the Ratana movement and the New Zealand Maori Council have done a great deal 
to improve the conditions of those they represent, and have made an inestimable 
contribution to the development of the relationship created by the Treaty. It is 
unlikely that their roles will diminish in the more transparent and accessible era of 
MMP. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that even individual Maori can expect 
greater opportunities to influence the government through improved opportunities to 
participate in consultative exercises and through the ballot box itself.
81 
81 
C MMP and Pan-Maori Organisations 
There will continue to be pressure for the creation of pan-Ma.mi organisations. From 
the perspective of the Crown a representative and mandated Maori body would lessen 
the costs and delays involved in undertaking consultation with Maori. Instead of the 
Crown waiting for Ma.mi to convene a hui, or undertaking a hui or series of hui itself 
( as in the case of the so-called "fiscal envelope" hui of early 1995) in order to 
asce1iain the views of Maori, there would be a one-stop shop. Variations of this 
theme have been a1iiculated by the Chief Judge of the Waitangi Tribunal; the Hon 
Peter Tapsell and the former Labour Cabinet minister and Muriwhenua negotiator the 
Hon Matiu Rata. It would also arguably carry more weight for Ma.mi than a number 
of smaller, less representative groups, and would in tum lessen the costs involved in 
gaining access to decision makers. 
By no means all Mao1i support such proposals. Sir Tipene O'Regan has, for 
example, c1iticised proposals to establish a national pan-Maori body as being racist 
and inefficient. He argues that Maori are no more unified than non-Maori and that 
The importance of the potential influence Maori might have on the media, and thereby on the 
perceptions of the electorate are beyond the scope of this paper. For an examination of the role of 
Maori women in this context see T Rangiheuea "The Role of Maori Women in Treaty settlements and 
Negotiations" (1995) 25 VUWLR 195. 
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such a body would exist for "the benefit of pakeha settler culture".
82 Attempts by 
the Crown, however well meaning, to create or encourage such a body have been and 
will continue to be unsuccessful. Some Maori would argue that not only are such 
attempts inconsistent with rangatiratanga and self-determination but they are 
paternalistic and insulting. Iwi may not wish to be recreated along pakeha lines. On 
the other hand, there has been recognition that governance structures are desirable in 
some circumstances, particularly in the sharing of resources obtained from the Crown 
in settling claims under the Treaty. 
83 
In order for a pan-Maori body to be taken seriously by a significant proportion of 
Maori it would have to be wholly independent from the Crown. It could not be 
created by statute or funded by government in order to preserve that sense of 
independence. One of the difficulties the Maori Council has faced is that its partial 
government funding has lead to it being distrusted by some for being dependent on 
the Crown. On the other hand, the Maori Congress is perceived to be independent 
yet struggles for financial support. Perhaps the most basic problem faced by a pan-
Ma01i organisation is the tension that would inevitably exist between it and iwi. 
While some iwi would no doubt support a body representing them in certain matters, 
other iwi would not wish a pan-Maori body to represent them on any issue. In any 
event, the creation of a new representative pan-Maori body does not appear 
imminent. Whether the adoption of an MMP electoral system will provide any 
stimulus for such a development remains to be seen. 
82 J King "Who speaks for Maori" above n 74, 16. See also C Trotter's elaborate proposal for a 
"representative and democratically elected National Maori Assembly created by a bi-cultural w
ritten 
constitution", "The Struggle for Sovereignty" New Zealand Political Review May 1995, 20-26. 
Other 
related proposals have inclined the establishment of a Maori senate or upper house , a separate 
Maori 
Parliament, a Maori Policy Commission, and regional councils which elect a national represen
tative 
body. 
83 See Crown Proposals for the Resolution of Treaty of Waitangi Claims - Detailed Proposals (Offi
ce of 
Treaty Settlements, Wellington, 1994) 96-97. 
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D Urban Maori 
The large number of urban Maori
84 can be expected to exert greater influence than 
they have in the past. The 1991 census of population and dwellings indicated that 
30.28% of Maori (some 154,800 people) bad no clear or direct tribal affiliation. In 
the two decades after the Second World War the Maori population displayed one of 
the most rapid rates of urbanisation in the world. The demographic shift away from 
the country and the resultant weakening of traditional affiliations bas bad substantial 
economic, cultural and social consequences. In the 1990s most Maori live in urban 
centres, many in multi-generational urban families, and are "over-represented 
amongst those with low incomes, poor housing and other social disadvantages".
85 
These demographic patterns will influence the development of policy by government 
for the remainder of the decade and beyond. New organisations could arise or 
existing structures may develop in order to ensure that those Maori affected by 
policies are listened to in their formulation. Already there are a number of urban 
Maori authorities in operation which may be expected to exploit the new 
environment. 86 
In Te Runanga o Muriwhenua and ors. v The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission and ors. Lord Cooke of Tborndon held that in the context of the 
fisheries allocation proceedings arising out of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act 1992, which implemented the Sealord Deal, consultation with 
84 Which Lord Cooke of Thomdon held to include those urban Maori who have no established 
connection with a specific tribe, including those who do not know of what iwi they may 
claim membership by descent or those who may have genealogical connections with more 
than one: Te Runanga o Muriwhenua and ors v The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission 
and ors., (the urban Maori fisheries case), C.A. 155/95, 30 April 1996, (unreported), at 21. 
85 R Pool Te Iwi Maori (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1991) 9 and 14. 
86 Such as the Manukau Urban Authority, the Te Whanau o Waipereira Trust, Te Runanganui 
0 Te Upoko O Te Ilea Association and the Te Runanga O Nga Maata Waka, which were 
parties in the urban Maori fisheries case cited above. 
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urban Maori was the statutory duty of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. 
His Lordship, delivering the judgment of the full court of the Court of Appeal, held 
that: 87 
Iwi refers, as we have said, to the people of the tribes; and this must include those 
entitled to be members although their specific tribal affiliation may not have been 
and even cannot be established. They are among those entitled to benefit from the 
pan-Maori settlement. Natural justice requires that as far as reasonably practicable 
they be consulted by the Commission. The most practicable mode of consultation 
with them is through the Urban Maori Authorities. We are satisfied that the 
Commission is right in being prepared to consult with them in that way. We hold 
that in all the circumstances that is the Commission ' s statutory duty. 
Significantly, His Lordship added that:
88 
This is required by the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles, applied as a living 
instrument in the light of developing national circumstances, which this court has 
previously held to be the right approach: see Te Runanga O Muriwhenua Ins. v 
Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641 at 655. 
The judgment is important for providing a precedent that obliges decision makers to 
at least consider undertaking consultation with urban Maori in the exercise of their 
statut01y decision making powers. While the decision turned on the provisions of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Settlement) Act, Lord Cooke relied, at least in pari, on 
the principles of the Treaty itself in reaching his conclusion. In my view the 
decision presages the inclusion of urban Maori authorities into the mainstream of 
Maori groups with whom the Crown and its agencies may be expected to consult. 
The authorities have the potential to play at least as important a part in the workings 
of the relationship with the Crown as the individual iwi themselves. Although, as 
Kelsey observes, "this sits uncomfortably with the revival of a tribally-centred world, 
87 Above n 84, at 29. 
88 Above n 84, 29. 
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and t1ibally based Treaty settlement policies of which urban Maori legitimately 
demand a share. "89 
E Comment 
The changes which Maoridom has undergone in the last twenty or so years have been 
considerable. It is difficult to predict what the changes to the Maori party to the 
Treaty relationship will be in the years ahead, and which of those changes are the 
result of M:MP itself and which are part of broader trends which would in all 
probability have occurred regardless. One thing is clear: the move to an M:MP 
electoral system will, over the medium term, influence the way in which iwi, hapu, 
and pan-Maori authorities develop and operate, in the same way as earlier changes 
to the political environment have influenced Maori since 1840. While the changes 
to the Crown may be more visible and more immediate (in the composition and 
organisation of the first MMP-elected government, and the proportional nature of the 
House, for example) the changes undergone by Ma01i will initially be more subtle. 
In time Maori may find that they enJoy improved access to the Crown and 
Parliament. Some iwi or hapu may find that it is more advantageous for them to 
operate independently in their dealings with the Crown, while pan-Maori or Maori 
sectoral interest groups should be as well placed to exploit the opp011Unities for 
access to decision makers as any other lobbyists . The prospects of MMP influencing 
the creation of a pan-Maori organisation are less clear. Inter-iwi rivalries will 
remain. Nonetheless, there should at least be a greater opportunity for the voices of 
Maori to be heard. 
89 J Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment (Bridget Williams, Auck.land, 1995) 365. 
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VIII PARLIAMENT AND REPRESENTATION 
A Maori Seats in Parliament 
Maori have been represented in the House of Representatives on a permanent basis
 
since 1868. The four Maori seats were first provided for in the Maori Representation
 
Act 1867 in what was intended to be a temporary measure until sufficient Maori men
 
had met the property franchise requirements of the New Zealand Constitution Act
 
1852. The Maori seats have remained a feature of successive New Zealand
 
Parliaments ever since.
90 The desirability of retaining the seats has been debated 
many times, most comprehensively by the Royal Commission on the Electoral
 
System in 1986. 
The Royal Commission found that the status of Maori in New Zealand ' s
 
constitutional and legal arrangements could be distinguished from that of other
 
minority interests in three respects. First, Maori are tangata whenua - New Zealand ' s
 
indigenous people. Secondly, the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by the Crown
 
and the chiefs in 1840 signified the beginning of constitutional government in this
 
country and afforded Maori special constitutional status. And thirdly, Maori have
 
historically had separate representation since the election of the first Maori MPs in
 
1868.91 The Royal Commission also set out a number of principles of Ma.mi
 
representation against which electoral systems could be evaluated: 
(a) Maori interests should be represented in Parliament by Maori MPs; 
90 Special representation had previously been granted to Otago goldminers who had no
t met the 
property requirement in 1862 and to Westland miners in 1867. They had been int
ended as 
temporary measures also. The Maori Representation Act 1867 was extended for f
ive years 
in 1872 and made indefinite in 1876. The Electoral Enrolment Act 1975 gave M
aori the 
option of registering on the Maori or the General roll , with the number of seats bei
ng set at 
four by the Electoral Amendment Act 1976. 
9 1 For an account of the history of Maori representation in Parliament see M Sore
nson "A 
history of Maori representation in Parliament" Report of the Royal Commission 
on the 
Electoral System (Wellington, December 1986) 89. 
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(b) Maori electors should have an effective vote,
 which all political parties 
compete for; 
(c) All MPs should be accountable to Maori elector
s; 
( d) Maori MPs should be democratically accountab
le to Maori electors; 
( e) Political parties' candidate selection procedures 
should be organised to allow 
Maori a voice in deciding who their candidates should 
be.92 
The Royal Commission found that the advantages of sep
arate representation were that 
Maori were guaranteed representation in Parliament, w
hich bas bistmically been of 
considerable imp011ance in keeping issues of inter
est to Maori alive in an 
unsympathetic environment, and that the Maori MPs w
ere directly accountable to 
their electors. On the other band, the Commission foun
d that the representatives of 
Maori and non-Maori alike "were ultimately respon
sible only to the pa11icular 
community that elected them", which bas contributed 
to the political isolation of 
Maori and comparative lack of influence of Maori 
MPs.93 The Commission 
recommended that MMP should be adopted as the b
est means for ensuring the 
effective representation of Maori, albeit with no separa
te seats, a common roll and 
no Maori option.
94 
As the 1988 Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Co
mmission noted, the Royal 
Commission envisaged that Maori representatives would
 be more likely to be elected 
through national lists under MMP. The Commission tho
ught that list MPs would be 
in the best position to address specific issues of concern
 to Maori, and alluded to the 
92 Above n 91, 89. 
93 Other disadvantages of the Maori electorates identified 
by the Royal Commission included 
the unwieldy size of the Maori electorates, the fact that t
he number of Maori seats was fixed 
at four and "unsatisfactory administrative arrangements"
. 
94 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System
, above n 91, 105-106. 
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likelihood that a separate Ma.mi party would win list seats (particularly if the 
proposed 4% threshold was waived for parties primarily promoting Maori interests). 
In addition, the fact that constituency MPs would be retained under MMP meant that 
electors would continue to enjoy meaningful links with their local MP. The Royal 
Commission concluded that "in terms of legitimacy, MMP was, and would be seen 
to be fairer in its representation of political parties, minorities and special interest 
groups. "95 
Interestingly, the Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Commission rejected the 
Commission's recommendation that MMP should be adopted as a means of providing 
effective representation for Maori.
96 
The [Electoral Law] Committee believed that a Mixed Member Proportional system 
would not necessarily guarantee to enhance Maori representation in Parliament. Its 
greatest disadvantage was that although such a system provided the opportunity and 
incentive for Maori representation, it did not guarantee that there would be any MPs 
specifically to represent Maori interests ... All but one Maori submission received by 
the Committee did not believe that proportional representation could replace separate 
Maori representation. They wanted such representation to continue, preferably with 
a number of seats that represented the population that identified with separate Maori 
seats for electoral purposes. The Royal Commission also acknowledged that all 
Maori submissions to it favoured the continuation of separate representation in 
Parliament... 
In the final analysis, it was felt that the Maori people themselves must determine the 
degree of influence they and their representatives should have in Parliament and the 
wider political system. 
95 Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1988) 
AJHR I.l 7B, 14. 
96 Above n 95, 25, 
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A majority of the Committee recommended the retention of a m
inimum of four 
Maori seats, with the number to be determined by the number of el
ectors of Ma.mi 
descent, and their children, who choose to go onto the Maori roll.
97 
Section 2 of the Electoral Act 1993 ( as amended) provides that the 
Maori electoral 
population is determined by first, dividing the total number of perso
ns registered as 
electors of Maori electoral districts, by the total number of persons o
f Maori descent 
registered as electors of either General electoral districts or Ma.mi e
lectoral districts 
(seats); and secondly, by applying that percentage to the total numb
er of ordinarily 
resident persons of New Zealand Maori descent as determined by 
the most recent 
census. Section 45(3) of the Electoral Act provides for the number
 of Maori seats 
by dividing the Maori electoral population by the South Island quota
98 (which is the 
general electoral population of the South Island divided by 16). 
The last Maori Option before the first MMP election, during which
 time qualified 
Maori could exercise the option of being registered on the Maori ro
ll or the general 
roll,99 was conducted between 15 February 1994 and 14 April 199
4. The Option 
resulted in an increase of Maori on the Maori roll of some 30.93
%, to 136,708. 
When the formula prescribed in the Electoral Act was applied the n
umber of Maori 
seats for the 45th Parliament was set at five . 
100 The next Maori option is to be 
97 The Committee also recommended that a special select committee o
f Parliament be 
established, whose composition would "reflect the partnership o
f the Treaty of 
Waitangi" to conduct a broad ranging inquiry about the "definition
 and protection 
of the political and electoral rights of the Maori people and the reco
gnition of their 
position under the Treaty of Waitangi ". 
98 Above, n 91 , 27-28. As determined bys 35(2)(b) of the Electoral A
ct 1993. 
99 As provided for in ss 7 6-79. 
100 Hon D.A.M. Graham, Minister of Justice , press statement, 22 Ap
ril 1994. See also the 
judgment of the full court of the Court of Appeal in Taiaroa and o
rs v Minister of Justice 
and ors, CA 201/94, 23 December 1994, at 9 , per Cooke P. 
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conducted in 1997, which will provide an opportunity for the number of Maori sea
ts 
in Parliament to be adjusted once again. 
101 
B Representation and its Consequences 
The new electoral system will offer Maori powerful incentives to re-align the focu
s 
of their attention, at least in part, from the Crown to Parliament. The point has bee
n 
made that if all Maori were to enrol on the Maori roll 
102 six or even seven seats 
could be reserved for Maori, in addition to those which might be held by Maori fro
m 
the party lists or elected to represent general seats. Nor is it inconceivable that
 a 
Maori party could receive 5% of the vote on a national scale, 
103 or that an iwi based 
regional party could successfully contest a general electorate. 
Increased representation in Parliament should translate into increased Maori influenc
e 
of the exercise of the functions of Parliament. The key issue will be whether Ma0
1i 
wish to pursue their aspirations through the predominantly pakeha Parliament 
or 
through their own fora based on the concepts of rangatiratanga and sel
f-
detennination. Some Maori advocate a new emphasis on Parliament. Donn
a 
Awatere-Huata, Ian Rikys and Dover Samuels, for example, argue that few Maori ca
n 
at present rightfully claim to speak for Maori whereas those who have bee
n 
democratically elected to Parliament have the authority of a mandate. Others hav
e 
advocated broad-based iwi-derived parties targeting a block-vote from Maori, whic
h 
101 Section 77(4) and (5) provide that the Maori option is to be held in the year of the 
census, 
except in years where the census and the expiry of parliament coincide, in which 
case the 
option shall be held the following year. 
102 It is believed that a large number of Maori are not registered on either roll. Estimate
s range 
from 12,000 to 60,000: Taiaroa and ors v Minister of Justice and ors, CA 201 /94, per
 Cooke 
P, at 6 (quoting Mr A McRobie, an adviser to the respondents, and Ms Sian Elias QC, 
counsel for the appellants). 
103 C James "The Stirring Parmer" in C James and A McRobie Turning Point - The
 1993 
Election and Beyond, (Williams, Wellington, 1993) 110-111. 
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could enter into coalition with sympathetic mainstream part
ies to address universal 
issues such as employment, health and education.
104 
It should not be assumed that an increased number of Mao
ri MPs will necessarily 
result in improved outcomes for Maori. It is possible that a v
ocal group of articulate 
Maori MPs could polarise other MPs who might find it d
esirable to exploit the 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction of other parts of the electorate
 at the apparent success 
of Ma.mi in Parliament. While Maori account for some 13%
 of the population it is 
possible that a much larger proportion of the electorate migh
t support policies which 
are unsympathetic to Ma.mi issues and concerns. Palme
r makes the point as 
follows: 105 
It is unpopular to try to address grievances of Maori. It is the 
familiar problem 
isolated by John Stuart Mill, the problem of the tyranny of the m
ajority .... In New 
Zealand the argument is most frequently put on the basis tha
t all New Zealanders 
have equal rights - Maori have those rights - they should be 
treated no differently 
in any respect from pakeha. The Treaty is history. From it 
nothing should spring 
now, the argument runs. There is a substantial political mar
ket for the argument, 
particularly if Maori politicians make it. Disguised prejudice
 is never far from the 
surface in New Zealand, whenever there is debate on Maori 
matters. 
Under FPP a Cabinet that wished to pursue a policy which
 was ahead of general 
public opinion could normally expect to do so with little d
ifficulty because of the 
size of Cabinet in comparison with the Government caucus a
s a whole and the strict 
discipline imposed on Government MPs. Arguably both the 
Labour Government of 
1984-1990 and the subsequent National Government pursued
 Maori-related policies 
(such as the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi claims) that w
ere ahead of the views 
of much of the electorate. An MMP Cabinet would not enjoy the
 same powers as 
its FPP predecessors. This will be especially so for minorit
y or minmity-coalition 
104 A Heal "Uncivil Disobedience - the Rebirth of Maori Radica
lism" Metro, April 1996. 
105 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis (M
clndoe, 1992), 74. 
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governments, although as noted above, not all policies concerning Mao
ri require 
legislation in order to be implemented. 
There is a sting in the tale for Maori of an electoral system based on a c
oncept of 
proportionality. It may well be that not only is the voice of Maori give
n greater 
weight in a Parliament elected under an MMP electoral system, but that 
the views 
of those who neither share nor support pro-Maori policies may be just as in
fluential. 
It cannot be assumed that Parliament will be pre-disposed to a sympathetic
 approach 
to Ma.mi issues, notwithstanding predictions that MMP would usher in 
a time of 
consensus. 
Whatever the disposition of Parliaments elected by MMP, it is clear that P
arliament 
has the potential, perhaps for the first time in the hist01y of this country, t
o become 
the primary forum for issues of importance to both Maori and the electorat
e at large 
to be debated and examined. There is potential for a new sense of transp
arency to 
be brought to such issues, as viewpoints which have been absent from Pa
rliament, 
or inadequately articulated in the past for a variety of reasons, are brought t
o the fore 
in a contest of ideas. 
While MMP will not make Maori an equal Treaty "partner" with the gove
rnment in 
the development of policy, it will enable Maori concerns and issues to pla
y a larger 
part in the legislative policy agenda. In the long run, MMP Parliaments increase 
the 
likelihood of Maori gaining an improved negotiating position compared to t
hat which 
they have experienced historically. 
C A New Relationship with Parliament 
The new relationship Maori will have with Parliament is manifested in a n
umber of 
ways. First, and most obviously, there ought to be an increased number of
 Maori in 
the House. This is primarily a result of the Maori option exercise adding
 an extra 
50 
Maori electoral district and in the likelihood that the parties will seek to attract Maori 
votes by featming Maori candidates prominently in the party lists.
106 
Secondly, the scmtiny function of Parliament will be enhanced by the additional 
number of MPs dedicated to sectoral select committees, with improved resources,
107 
allowing the committees to have a greater influence in their overview of the 
operations of the government. The Maori Affairs committee in particular may enjoy 
a new prominence in the eyes of Maori. Thirdly, Maori are likely to discover that 
Parliament will provide a useful alternative avenue to pursue or influence policies 
which concern them, rather than having to deal exclusively with the Crown in such 
matters. 
The potential of any re-alignment of power between the Crown and Parliament to 
result in favourable outcomes for Maori depends on a number of factors. They 
include the composition of the government (that is, whether it is a minority, mino1ity 
coalition, or majority coalition, and whether Ma01i MPs f01m part of the governing 
arrangement); the political relationship between the government and the House and 
its committees; the policies of the parties in Parliament with respect to Maori issues; 
and, perhaps most importantly of all, the willingness of Maori to participate in the 
process and exploit the opp01iunities available. 
106 As the National Party has done with the high list place allocated to Georgina Te Heuheu prior 
to the 1996 election . 
107 List MPs will also have more time to devote to the parliamentary aspects of their work, and 
although they do not represent a constituency they may still perform other roles which link 
them to the communities they serve. 
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IX The Role of the Courts 
A General 
In the fifteen or so decades since the chiefs and the representatives of Queen Victoria 
gathered at Waitangi in the summer of 1840 it has fallen to the courts on many 
occasions to determine the ramifications and legality of the Treaty.
108 While a 
studied consideration of the treatment of the Treaty by the courts is a task beyond 
the scope of this paper, it would be fair to say that the judicial dicta concerning the 
Treaty have been spoken in the voices of their times - from Prendergast CJ' s 
nullifying observations in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, 
109 to the orthodoxy of 
the P1ivy Council in Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Ao tea District Maori Land Board, 
110 
and ultimately the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
There are few significant cases concerning the Treaty prior to the 1980s. That is not 
to say that those cases have not had substantial consequences. The decision of the 
Privy Council in Hoani Te Heuheu 's case, for example, in which their Lordships held 
that the Treaty had no enforceable status in domestic, or municipal, law remains the 
position today. This was confirmed by the decision of the majmity of the Court of 
108 For an examination of the much neglected area of Maori law prior to the Treaty see R Boast 
"The Law and the Maori" Spiller, Finn and Boast A New Zealand Legal History (Brooker's, 
Wellington, 1995) 125-127. 
109 
( 1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72 at 78. 
110 [1948] AC 308. See also CJ Duncan Hoani Te Heuheu vAotea District Maori Land Board: 
Maori Land Administration in West Taupo, 1906-41 (LL.B.(Hons) Research Paper VT.JW, 
1994 ). 
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Appeal to adopt the ratio of Hoani Te Heuheu 's case in NZ Maori Council v A-G.
111 
Until the last decade the courts have played a relatively minor role in determining 
the place of the Treaty in the national consciousness. In recent years, however, the 
courts (adding to the efforts of Maori themselves since the mid 1970s) have given 
the Treaty a new and lasting prominence in the realms of law and politics, and 
society at large. I have already referred to the dramatic effect of Cooke P's 
evocation of partnership. 
Yet the ability of the courts to effect major change in this context is limited. 
Whether, for example, the judicial re-examination of the Treaty would, or indeed 
could, have occurred without the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 by 
the third Labour Government, and the references to the "principles of the Treaty" in 
legislation enacted by the fourth Labour Government is a moot point. Fmiher, nearly 
all the major Treaty litigation has concerned statutes which refer expressly to the 
principles of the Treaty or to Mao1i interests specifically. 
112 
The legislative emphasis of Treaty jurispmdence is a consequence of the finding that 
the Treaty is not pati of domestic law. The role of the courts in the context of 
Treaty issues is limited largely to interpreting and applying legislation. This 
emphasises the imp01iance of both the Crown in determining the policies which will 
be implemented in the legislation, and thereby prescribing the extent to which the 
Treaty is of application, and Parliament for enacting it. As I see it, the energies of 
Ma.mi would be better directed at lobbying the executive and the legislature before 
the legislation is enacted rather than resorting to costly litigation at a later date. 
111 In which McKay J, delivering a judgment for the majority, held that Treaty rights can only 
be asserted in the courts where they have been recognised by statute: [ 1992] 2 NZLR 576, 
603. The cases dealing with the Treaty have received careful consideration by Lord Cooke 
in the Henry Harkness lecture at the University of Waikato of May 1994 - The Challenge of 
Treaty of Waitangi Jurisprudence. For an analysis of the Treaty and municipal law see P 
Joseph, above n 4, 54-62. 
112 Sir Kenneth Keith "The Roles of the Tribunal the Courts and the Legislature" (1995) 25 
VUWLR 129, 132-133. 
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The tangible results for Maori after nearly twenty years appearing before the courts 
and the Waitangi Tribunal have not been great. For some, the effects of the massive 
attention the judicialisation of the Treaty has brought with it have been disappointing. 
Kelsey makes the point as follows: 
113 
The Maori litigants themselves secured relatively little from the SOEs and 
privatisation litigation, at considerable financial and human cost. Actual or 
threatened litigation had improved their negotiating position, enabling Maori to 
secure promises for the future which might or might not be fulfilled. Those 
settlements that were secured were generally minimal in terms of the value of the 
assets and locked into a form that was consistent with the prevailing market ethos. 
In the process, Maori litigants had conceded the authority of the court to define the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and to subordinate it to the economic, political and ideological 
requirements of colonial capitalism. 
Similarly, Wainwright argues that there has been little substantive change in the 
approach of the courts over the last 10 years. The only effective change, in which 
the Waitangi Tribunal has played a part, has been the enactment of legislation which 
specifically impmi the Treaty or its principles into domestic law. The consequence 
is that the involvement of the courts has been, and remains, "dependent on the 
willingness of the legislative arm of government to import it into legislation. "
114 
That is not to say that the focus on the courts as arbiters on Treaty matters is 
necessarily inappropriate. The doctrine of the separation of powers, relatively weak 
as it may be in formal terms in this country, places the courts in a special position 
with respect to the Crown. The comis represent an alternative avenue of redress for 
Maori in Treaty issues and serve as a check on executive action. Nowhere, in my 
113 J Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Williams, Wellington, 1993) 284. 
114 CM Wainwright "Lawyer as Lobbyist: Leverage through litigation: the new Maori politics" 
1993 NZ Law Conference papers, volume 2, 294 at 312. Previously submitted as an LLM 
research paper, VUW, 1991. 
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view, is the potential of the courts to influence government policies more significant 
than in the context of Treaty jurisprudence. 
B The Waitangi Tribunal 
The Waitangi Tribunal is constituted under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, and 
comp1ises the Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court as the chairperson, and up to 16 
additional representatives appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation 
of the Minister of Ma01i Affairs, in consultation with the Minister of Justice, for a 
te1m of up to three years. In considering the suitability of persons for appointment 
to the Tribunal the Minister must have regard to the "partnership between the two 
parties to the Treaty and shall have regard not only to a person's personal attributes 
but also to a person's knowledge of and experience in different aspects of matters 
likely to come before the Ttibunal".
115 
The T1ibunal is not a court of record. With the notable exception of the Chairperson, 
the appointees to the Tribunal do not enjoy tenure of office. The traditional 
separation between the executive and a quasi-judicial tribunal is indistinct in the case 
of the Tribunal, as the members are appointed for a comparatively short term and the 
work of the Tribunal may be affected adversely by government-imposed budgetary 
constraints. 116 
The primary function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate on claims made by Mao1i that 
acts or omissions of the Crown arising since 1840 were contrary to the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi.
117 If a claim is held by the Tribunal to be well-founded it 
115 Section 4(2A) Waitangi Tribunal Act 1975. Roughly a third of the members of the Tribunal 
in 1996 were Maori. 
116 Although perhaps a more serious practical concern is the comparatively small number of 
skilled researchers and historians able to assist the members of the Tribunal in their work. 
117 Section 6. See also R Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal - "Conscience of the Nation" or Just 
Another Court" (1993) 16 Univ NSW LR 223. 
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may recommend to the Crown that it take steps to provide compensation or remove 
the prejudice. 11 8 In addition to recommending monetary compensation or the 
recovery of Crown land where a claim is upheld the Tribunal may recommend 
policies for the government to pursue or make binding recommendations in relation 
to SOE assets and certain Crown forests. 
119 
The Waitangi Tribunal process exemplifies the inter-action between the claimants, 
the government, Parliament and the courts. The claimants will be heard by the 
Tribunal (as will the Crown, represented by counsel from the Crown Law Office), 
which will in time issue a report which may contain recommendations for the 
government. The government may in turn present legislative proposals to Parliament 
to implement those recommendations. The resulting legislation will then fall to be 
interpreted by the comis, which will also consider any judicial review proceedings 
which a1ise in the course of the process or in the exercise of any statutory powers .
120 
After a quiet start the Tribunal became prominent in the mid-1980s with a se1ies of 
major reports on a wide range of matters.
121 The Tribunal has been likened to an 
118 Section 6(3) and (4). 
119 Chief Judge Durie "The Tribunal and the Treaty" (1995) 25 VUWLR 97 at 97. The 
Chief Judge notes that claims may be grouped into three categories: historical , 
contemporary and conceptual. Historical claims themselves may be either major or 
specific and cover the following broad areas: the confirmation of pre-Treaty 
purchases; Crown purchases prior to 1865; purchases under the Native Land Courts 
system; confiscations and expropriations; title arrangements and developments under 
the Native land Court system. 
Contemporary claims include the impact of resource management policies; Maori 
language; Maori land issues; Maori participation in economic development, judicial 
systems and administrative structures; Crown asset sales; education, immigration; 
intellectual property issues and so on. 
Conceptual claims usually concern the involvement of Maori in the use of natural 
resources. 
120 Sir Kenneth Keith above n 112, 130. 
121 Such as the Motunui Report concerning marine pollution in Taranaki; the Kaituna River 
Report and the Manukau Report into river pollution; the recognition of the Maori language 
claim reports on the Orakei and Waiheke Island claims; the Muriwhenua Fisheries Report; 
the radio frequencies claim; the Ngai Tahu Report, and the interim Taranaki Report. 
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ongoing commission of inquiry - in the words of Lord Cooke it is "essentially an 
investigatory and recommendatory body" .
122 The Tribunal has performed a valuable 
role in both investigating and publicising issues which had hitherto received little 
attention. Indeed the educative role of the Tribunal is of great importance. It is 
through public awareness that public support for policies consistent with the 
principles of the Treaty will be fostered. That support will be essential for 
meaningful progress in an MMP environment. 
Besides communicating the importance of Treaty issues to the electorate, the Tribunal 
is a crucial link between the Crown and Maori. It is a forum where issues arising 
out of the Treaty relationship may be addressed. 
123 While the Tribunal is vulnerable 
to claims that it encourages a "grievance industry", it would be interesting to 
speculate as to what form those grievances would have been manifested in the 
Tribunal's absence. The Tribunal is in some respects a safety valve, in the sense that 
it allows grievances to be explored and worked through in a culturally appropriate 
manner. Its importance in the years ahead is likely to lie, in my view, in its potential 
to address grievances, or to facilitate the settlement of claims, constructively and 
without acrimony. This is because the powers of the Tribunal are essentially 
recommendatory. A government may elect not to heed the Tribunal ' s 
recommendations if it wishes, thereby highlighting the need for Maori to become 
involved in or influence the policies and decisions of the government. As I have 
observed above, the move to an MMP electoral system provides significant 
opportunities for this to occur. 
12? - Lord Cooke of Thomdon, above n 111 , 20. 
123 For a less benevolent view of the role played by the Tribunal and the apparent di fficul ties it 
has faced see Kelsey , above n 113, 286-290. Kelsey concluded that: 
"Since 1983 the Waitangi Tribunal had provided a crucial weapon of 
passive revolution. It has drawn Maori off the streets and into a state-
controlled forum. How much longer it could continue this function was 
unclear. ... The demise of the Tribunal as an option for effective redress, 
the recapitulation of the courts on the Treaty, and the widespread espousal 
of tribal sovereignty, suggested a deepening sense of alienation from a state 
which saw no obligations to deliver on its historical obligations, and a 
much more rocky and unpredictable path ahead." 
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C Comment 
1 General 
Maori have resorted to the courts on numerous occasions in recent years when 
wishing to challenge Government decisions, or the decisions of government 
departments. The results of the resources expended on those proceedings have been 
significant, but not dramatic. However, if the opportunities for increased 
involvement in decision making do materialise in the next few years, new factors will 
influence the choice of instruments which Maori choose to devote their resources to 
in order to achieve their goals. The courts were the only arena in which the 
government decisions affecting Maori could effectively be challenged during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
As Maori representation in Parliament increases and becomes more effective, and as 
governments adopt a more consultative approach to decision making, the need to 
resort to the courts should diminish. The courts will remain a crucial backstop, and 
will continue to be imp01iant for reviewing the decisions of decision makers where 
the p1inciples of the Treaty have not been complied with or been given regard to. 
2 Judicial review 
The possible ramifications of a move to an MMP electoral system have been 
explored above. A further facet is the likely impact of the new regime on the 
exercise of the comis' powers of judicial review pursuant to the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972. The courts have displayed a willingness in recent years to 
apply their administrative law powers to proceedings involving Treaty issues. France 
observes that administrative law duties may arise where there is a statutory duty to 
comply with Treaty principles; a statutory duty to have regard to or take account of 
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Treaty principles; or even where there is no statutory reference to the Treaty or its 
principles. 124 
Chen raises the question of whether the increased representation that MMP will bring 
to Maori in Parliament, and the improved oppmtunities that the new electoral system 
will provide for the involvement of Maori in government and Parliamentary 
processes, will undermine the basis for the "special protection" of Maori by the 
courts. Fmiher, "will such groups now have greater access to the political process 
to protect themselves?"125 
Regardless of whether the courts are in fact swayed by such considerations, and it 
is perhaps arguable that they might be, the Judicature Amendment Act allows 
decisions made pursuant to a statutory power or right, under a constitution, rule or 
bylaw of any body corporate which affects the rights, powers and privileges of a 
person to be reviewed. The remedies available to the courts enable them to oversee 
decisions which have consequences for members of the public. The English Court 
of Appeal has held in R v Panel of Takeovers & Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc
126 
that 
as the power and rights affected become more important, the more likely it becomes 
that judicial review will be available whatever the source of the power. 
3 Privy Council 
In my view, the abolition of the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council will have very little substantive effect on either Maori or the Crown. 
124 E France "Administrative Law Duty or Treaty Obligation? - the Present Landscape" paper 
for AIC Conference, 22 and 23 April 1996, 2. See also D Round "De baleanis novitur 
inventis - the Ngai Tahu whale watching case" [1996] NZLJ 164. 
125 M Chen "The Introduction of MMP Representation in New Zealand - Implications for 
Lawyers" (1994) 5 PLR 104, 115. 
126 [1987] QB 815. See also P Radich and M Scholtens "Judicial Review" NZLS seminar, July 
1995, 3. 
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As Cooke P has observed, 
127 Treaty litigation has primarily been fought out in the 
Court of Appeal through the case removed procedure, and more recently in the High 
Court. The impact of the Privy Council on Treaty jurisprudence has not been great -
Maori have not been successful in a case taken to the Privy Council since 1904. 
Yet many Maori oppose proposals to remove the right of appeal as severing a link 
between this country and the monarchy, on whose behalf Captain Hobson signed the 
Treaty. As the Attorney-General, the Hon Paul East QC, put it: 
128 
From a Maori perspective, the Privy Council is seen as a form of access to the 
Sovereign which is of symbolic importance in relation to the Treaty and should not 
be interfered with. The Privy Council is also seen as a body which has always 
sought to protect indigenous rights and has considerable competence and experience 
in this area. 
Nonetheless, the learned Attorney continued that: 
129 
... abolition of appeals to the Privy Council will not reduce opportunities for Maori 
to pursue settlement of Treaty claims with the Crown, nor affect the place of the 
Treaty in our society. 
The Treaty may possibly encompass a right to a judicial system with certain core 
values such as independence and fairness. However the right to these attributes in 
a judicial system is one that equally applies to all citizens. Any Treaty right does 
not in my view require retention of access to the Privy Council or to any other 
external judicial body ... 
127 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, above n 111, 15. 
128 Lawtalk 13 May 1996, 6. 
\?9 - Above n 128, 6. 
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A first hand knowledge of New Zealand conditions is of special importance and 
value to a court in Treaty cases and this factor strongly favours ending Privy 
Council appeals 
It is interesting to speculate whether the judicial re-discovery of the Treaty would 
have occurred bad all the proceedings been heard by the law lords rather than the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal. I agree, with respect, with the views articulated by 
the Attorney-General. Putting spiritual or symbolic links to one side, the abolition 
of the right of appeal to the Privy Council should have very little impact on the 
ongoing relationship between the parties to the Treaty.
130 
X CONCLUSION 
The evolving relationship between the Crown and Maori is one of fundamental 
constitutional and national importance. The nature of that relationship is, however, 
one of considerable complexity and ambiguity. The complexity arises out of the 
number of parties interested in the relationship in the politically sophisticated 
environment of the late 1990s, their aspirations, New Zealand's unique constitutional 
aITangements, and the role of the Treaty itself. The ambiguity a1ises from such 
factors as the concept of the Crown, the unknown potential of the new electoral 
system, the new influence of Parliament, and the aspirations of, and tensions within, 
Maoridom itself. 
The parties to the Treaty are moving, as I see it, to a 'post-partnership' era. Putting 
symbolism to one side, the Crown and Maori are not and arguably never have been 
partners in any meaningful sense.
13 1 That is not for a moment to deny the crucial 
130 The New Zealand Courts Structure Bill 1996 was introduced on 18 June 1996. The Bill 
abolishes the right of appeal to the Privy Council and provides that a re-structured Court of 
Appeal is the final appellate court in New Zealand. The Bill provides for a commencement 
date of 1 July 1997. (1996) 19 TCL 23 , 14. 
13 1 Note that the Crown has the responsibility to govern in the best interests of all New 
Zealanders. This may at times involve a degree of tension between what is in the best 
interests of Maori and what is in the best interests of the electorate as a whole. 
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importance of the relationship between the Crown and Maori. It is simply to 
recognise that to cast the relationship in the terms of a simple partnership is a 
potentially dangerous over-simplification. A dyadic concept of partnership, exclusive 
of Parliament, risks missing the very real opportunities that MMP represents. 
If one considers the nature of the relationship as expressed by the Court of Appeal, 
it becomes clear that the Court used the concept of partnership to express and 
emphasise the fiduciary nature of the relationship. The Treaty signified a partnership. 
Partnership was an analogy which illustrated the precepts of good faith and mutual 
obligation. 
Partnership is a subjective term. It means different things to the comis, to the 
Crown, and to Maori. Further, as I see it, partnership misrepresents the reality. In 
broad tenns, the Crown consists of Ministers and their departments of state, 
responsible to Parliament. The interests of each of those Ministers, and each 
department, differ. The Crown is not in this analysis as unified an entity as some 
might believe. Nor is there a single, unified Maori Treaty partner. Each pa1ty to the 
Treaty has internal divisions and competing interests. For Maori , these interests will 
find new opportunities for influence and expression in an MMP Parliament. 
The impact of MMP defies accurate predication. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
discern a number of implications for each of the parties to the Treaty. 
For the Crown, the most significant implications will be for the organisation and 
operation of the Cabinet, and in the Cabinet's relationship with Parliament. No 
longer will the Cabinet be as dominant a force as it once was. Even so, the Cabinet 
will remain the p1imary decision maker in our political system, although the way in 
which it makes those decisions and its ability to implement them might change. 
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A further impact of MMP for the Crown will be in its relationship with Parliament. 
As legislation is at the heart of the Crown-Maori relationship, any shift of legislative 
authority from the Crown to Parliament could well alter the balance on Maori issues. 
The Cabinet is likely to consist of two or more parties in coalition, or be a single 
party minority. In either scenario, the Crown's relationship with Parliament will be 
different to that under a first past the post system. Parliament will assume a new 
importance. 
Equally, MMP has significant implications for Maori. They include the incentives 
for the fo1mation of pan-Maori organisations and individual groups to participate in 
government decision making. MMP may encourage pan-Maori kotahitanga 
movements. In contrast, it may also encourage individual iwi or hapu, or the urban 
Maori authorities, to participate in the political system on their own behalf. Hapu, 
iwi and urban Maori authorities have their own agendas and priorities which the 
inclusive environment that MMP represents will recognise and encourage. 
Yet, in my view, the greatest impact of MMP will be on Parliament itself. There are 
likely to be a larger number of Maori MPs in Parliaments elected by MMP, although 
they will continue to be members of existing general political parties such as 
National, Labour, the Alliance, or New Zealand First. It will be some time before 
Maori political parties are independently represented in Parliament. Maori will, over 
time, begin to exploit the new opportunities for influence which MMP represents. 
Maori may potentially enjoy a new, vigorous relationship with Parliament. With 
representation goes influence. Maori will find that the partial re-alignment of power 
to the House will provide a useful counterpoint to Cabinet, and will be a less costly 
means of influencing favourable outcomes than litigation. That is not to say that the 
enhanced opportunities will necessarily result in more favourable outcomes for 
Maori, as the opportunities will be costly to exploit. Further, the proportionality of 
MMP may prove to be equally encouraging for those parts of the electorate which 
are unsympathetic to Maori issues. The potential of such groups to operate in a 
manner counter-productive to Maori interests should not be under-estimated. 
63 
The future evolution of the Crown-Maori relationship, and of their respective 
relationships with MMP Parliaments is difficult to discern. Whether the effects of 
the new electoral system will be as significant as some people believe cannot be 
predicted. But one thing is clear. The emergence of a new era will depend on the 
goodwill and participation of all New Zealanders. 
When Hobson said at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, "He iwi tahi tatou" he 
was not saying we are one homogeneous people but that we are one nation made up 
of at least two distinctive peoples, with room for more. Our nationhood consists not 
in either group on its own but in what is generated out of the relation between us.
132 
132 Dame Joan Metge "Ko te wero Maori - the Maori challenge" Family Law Conference papers 
NZLS , 1991, 3. 
Articles 
64 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Boast R "The Waitangi Tribunal - Conscience of the Nation or Just Anoth
er 
Court?" (1993) 16 Univ NSW LR 223 
Chen M "The Introduction of MMP in New Zealand - the Implications for
 
Lawyers" (1994) 5 PLR 104 
Chen M "Parliament and Law-making under MMP: the New Standing Or
ders" 
papers of the NZ Law Society Conference in Dunedin, April, 1996. 
Duncan C "Hoani Te Heuheu v Aotea Maori District Land Board: Mao1i L
and 
Administration in West Taupo, 1906-1941" (LLB (Hons) research paper, V
UW, 
1994) 
Dmie E "The Tribunal and the Treaty" (1995) 25 VUWLR 97 
France E "Administrative Law Duty or Treaty Obligation? - the Present 
Landscape" paper for AIC conference, April 1996 
Heal A "Uncivil Disobedience - the Rebirth of Maori Radicalism" Metro 
(Auckland, April, 1996) 
Horton M "The Rise of Maori Capitalism" New Zealand Monthly Review,
 
November-December 1993. 
Keith, Sir Kenneth "The Roles of the Tribunal, the Courts and the Legislat
ure" 
(1995) 25 VUWLR 129 
65 
Kerr R "Public Policy making under MMP" speech to IIR Conference on Public 
Affairs and Lobbying, Wellington, 21 February, 1995 
Kerr R "Vision 20/20: Directions for New Zealand - Reflections on Electoral 
Reform" (NZ Business Roundtable, Auckland, 1993) 
King J "Who speaks for Maori?" (Evening Post, Wellington, 28 February 1995) 
McGuire J "Reflections on the formal definitions of Maori" [ 1995] NZLJ 168 
Radich P and M Scholtens "Judicial Review" NZ Law Society seminar, July 1995. 
Rangiheuea "The Role of Maori Women in Treaty Settlements and Negotiations" 
(1995) 25 VUWLR 195 
Round D "De balaenis novitur inventis - the Ngai Tahu whale watching case" 
[ 1996] NZLJ 164 
Trotter C "The Struggle for Sovereignty" New Zealand Political Review (May 
1995) 
Wainwright C "Leverage through Litigation" papers of the NZ Law Society 
Conference, 1993 
Books/Publications 
Belich J Making Peoples - A History of the New Zealanders (Penguin, 1996) 
Boast R "The Law and Maori" in Spiller P, Finn J and Boast RA New Zealand 
Legal History (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) 
66 
Bollard A The Economic Consequences of Electoral Reform Discussion Pa
per No 
38 (NZIER, Wellington, 1993) 
Boston J "The future of cabinet government in New Zealand - the imp
lications of 
MMP for the formation, organisation and operations of the cabinet" (V
UW 
Graduate school of Business and Government Management, Wellington
, 1994) 
Cowen P et al An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Change in New 
Zealand (NZ Business Roundtable, Wellington, 1992) 
Cleave P The Sovereignty Game (VUW, Wellington, 1990) 
Cox L Kotahitanga - The Search for Maori Political unity (Auckland Unive
rsity 
Press, Auckland, 1993) 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Cabinet Office Manual 
(Wellington, 1996) 
Fleras A and. Elliott J The Nations Within - Aboriginal State Relations in C
anada, 
The United States, and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 19
92) 
Gardiner W Return to Sender (Reed, Wellington, 1996) 
Harris P and E McLeay "The Legislature" in G Hawke (ed.) Changing Po
litics -
the Electoral Referendum 1993 (Victoria University of Wellington, Welling
ton, 
1993) 
Hawke G (ed.) Changing Politics - the Electoral Referendum 1993 (Victo1i
a 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1993) 
James C and McRobie A Turning Point - the 1993 Election and Beyond 
(Williams, Wellington, 1993) 
67 
Joseph P Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book C
o, 
Sydney, 1993) 
Kawharu I H Waitangi - Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 
Kelsey JA Question of Honour?: Labour and the Treaty (Allen & Unwin, 
Wellington, 1990) 
Kelsey J Rolling Back the State (Williams, Wellington, 1993) 
Orange C The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) 
McHugh P G The Maori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland 19
91) 
Ministry of Justice The Directory of Official Information (Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington, 1995) 
Ministry of Justice Report of Submissions on the Crown Proposals for the 
Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims (Ministry of Justice, 1995) 
Mulgan R "Political Culture" in G Hawke ( ed.) Changing Politics - the Electo
ral 
Referendum 1993 (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1993) 
Mulgan R Maori, Pakeha and Democracy (Oxford University Press, Auckland
, 
1989) 
New Zealand Law Commission A New Zealand Guide to International Law an
d 
its Sources NZLC R34, (Wellington, 1996). 
New Zealand House of Representatives Inquiry into the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System [ 1988] AJHRl. l 7B 
68 
New Zealand House of Representatives Report of the Standing Orders Committee 
on the Review of Standing Orders [1995] AIBR 1.18A 
Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims (Office of Treaty Settlements/TOWPU, Wellington, 1994) 
Pool R Te lwi Maori (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1991) 
Renwick W The Treaty Now (GP Books, Wellington, 1990) 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (Wellington, 1996) 
Vasil R Biculturalism - Reconciling Aotearoa within New Zealand (VUW, 
Wellington, 1988) 
Vowles Jet al Towards Consensus? (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995) 
Spiller P, Finn J and Boast RA New Zealand Legal Histmy, (Brooker' s, 
Wellington, 1995) 
State Services Commission Worldng Under Proportional Representation - A 
Reference for the Public Service (SSC, Wellington, 1995) 
Strom K Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990) 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 16,047 words. There are approximately 20,233 words in 
this paper in total. 
l f1f 1f 111~111i111111 [11i1f 11111~ 11111]~ ~~f 1~11111 111~ ~ii1i1~f 11 
3 7212 00556707 6 


